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While federal and state legislatureshave largely ignored wide-spread and
acute deficiencies in the programs that ensure representation for the vast
majority of individuals accused of crime,' an unprecedented number of
actually innocent-wrongly convicted-men have been freed from prison or
death row.2 Recent investigations into the causes of these wrongful
convictions reveal that bad lawyering significantly contributed to many of the
adjudicatory disaster^.^ I believe these multiple and damning revelations4will
encourage bar associations and law reform organizations to challenge
inadequatecriminal defense delivery systems in the courts and motivate courts
to hear and decide the claims. My certainty is bolstered by a coherent and
compelling philosophy ofjudicial policy making hypothesized by MalcolmM.
Feeley and Edward L. Rubiri from their study of the role the courts played in

1. DAVIDCOLE,NO EQUALJUSTICE
92 (1999) ("Providing genuinely adequate counsel for poor
defendants would require a substantial infusion of money and indigent defense is the last thing the populace
will voluntarily direct its tax dollars to fund. Achieving solutions to this problem through the political
process is a pipe dream."); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of
Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give A Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE
L. REV.1079 (1993) (explaining in a fun and forceful essay why the legislature will never adequately fund
criminal defense since most people arrested and charged with crimes are members of a small sliver of
society-young minority males-whose rights everyone else feels fairly sanguine about ignoring). Lack
of legislative support for defense services is discussed infra at notes 96 through 98 and accompanying text.
2.
JIMDWYER,PETERNEUFELD
AND BARRY
SCHECK.,ACTUALINNOCENCE:
FIVEDAYSTO
EXECUTION
AND OTHER
DISPATCHES
FROM THE WRONGLY
CONVICTED
(2000) (containing case studies of
wrongful convictions, explaining which factors in the criminal justice system contributed to their
occurrence, and proposing changes).
3. James S. Leibman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital
Cases 1973-1995,Executive Summary, at ii (finding that incompetenceof defense lawyers is a major cause
of reversal of convictions in state capital cases). See also Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses
Cloud Verdicts, CHI.TRIB.,Nov. 15, 1999,s 1, at 1 (reporting that of the twelve men originally sentenced
to death "in Illinois who have been exonerated since 1987, four were represented at trial by an attorney who
has been disbarred or suspended").
4. To those of us who work as public defenders,or assigned counsel, or who are involved in efforts
to support and improve the provision of defense services, these revelations are not a surprise. Some of the
most persuasive commentary on the inadequacies of defense services was written over twenty-five years
ago by David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U . Cfi. L. REV. 1 (1973) and The
Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 CEO.L.J. 81 1 (1976). A great deal more has been written since
KLEIN& ROBERTSPANGENBERG,
THE
then. For some of the most damning critiques see RICHARD
INDIGENT DEFENSECRISIS(1993); Vivian 0.Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old
L. REV.9 (1986); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM.
Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997
AM. L. 783; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the
ANN.SURV.
CONST.L.Q. 625 (1986).
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS
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reforming the prison system during the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ .To
~ understand the power of
their thesis, it is necessary to look at Talley v. stephens6--one of the groundbreaking prison reform cases upon which their philosophy rests.
In 1965, the Arkansas State Penitentiary was administered in the style of
a southern plantation. Crops were grown for profit and prisoners worked in
the fields, watched over by other prisoners-not by professional guards.'
Whipping was inflicted for an inmate's failure to work hard e n ~ u g h It
. ~was
imposed summarily. The extent and severity of the punishment was
determined at the whim of the prison employee holding the whip?
In 1965, no case law existed that interpreted the Eighth Amendment to
ban corporeal prison punishment."' Nonetheless, that year Judge J. Smith
Henley, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Arkansas, although unwilling to read a broad prohibition against corporeal
punishment into the language of the Constitution, found a way to enjoin
whipping in the penitentiary: he determined that whipping could not be
inflicted without procedural safeguards."
Until then, courts refused to intervene in the operation of prisons. When
asked to consider the appropriatenessor constitutionalityof prison conditions
or discipline, courts focused on the needs of prison officials and the general
public and were sympathetic, in the main, to the difficulties of running a safe
and orderly correctional institution.'' Judge Henley looked at the prisons from
a different point of view. He saw the inmates and their plight at the hands of
the prison authorities. He understood the interests of the administrators,but,
at the same time, he did not let those considerations eclipse judicial concern
for the inmates.13

5. MALCOLMM. FEELEY
& EDWARD
L.RUBIN,JUDICIALPOLICY MAK~NG
AND THE MODERN
STATE:HOW THE COURTS
REFORMED
AMERICA'S
PRISONS (1998).
Ark. 1965).
6. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D.
& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 52-53.
7. FEELEY
8. Id. at 54.
9. Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 687-88.
10. In fact until the 1960's. an unspoken but powerful "hands-OW' doctrine prevented judges from
intervening in the administration of prisons and from applying constitutional protections to prisoners. See
MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN,
RIGHTSOF PRISONERS
5 1.02 (2d ed. 1993).
I I. Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 689.
supra note 10, at 7-8.
12. MUSHLIN,
13. Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 686 (stating that
On the other hand, convicts must be disciplined, and prison authorities must be given wide latitude
and discretion in the management and operation of their institutions, including the disciplining of
inmates. The Courts cannot take over the management of prisons, and they cannot undertake to
review every complaint made by a convict about his treatment while in the prison.).
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Judge Henley's efforts to reform the Arkansas prison system did not end
with an injunction against whipping at the Arkansas Penitentiary, and Talley
was not the last case that he would decide. In fact, until 1977, two years after
he joined the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Henley presided over a
series of cases involving the administration of the Arkansas prison system.I4
His decisions were not limited to a single institution.I5 They affected the
entire prison system in the state.16 Ultimately, he condemned not just
corporeal punishment, but the entire plantation prison system that worked the
inmates for profit."
To guide his decision-making, Judge Henley appointed lawyers to
represent the plaintiff-prisoners, held hearings, listened to the testimony of
expert witnesses, inspected the prisons himself, assigned special masters to
implement court orders, and supervised the reform efforts.'' By the time the
prison litigation was reassigned, Judge Henley, with the support of the Eighth
Circuit, had succeeded in transforming the Arkansas prison system from top
to bottom; and in so doing, he had re-interpreted the Constitution. Without a
doubt, Judge Henley took an activist approach to his decision-making. He
refused to confine himself to the relief requested by the initial inmate
plaintiffs; instead, he issued broad injunctive relief requiring systemic
reform.19 He issued many and very detailed orders. His involvement was
administrative and managerial.''
Feeley and Rubin applaud Judge Henley's aggressive and creativejudicial
policy making.*' Their treatise explains and justifies the form of judicial
activism that Judge Henley' prison decisions exemplify.22They suggest that
before a judge will engage in this kind of work, the judge must be motivated
and motivated by a discontinuity between the judge's personal moral belief
and reality.23 Second, the court must have a grant of jurisdiction that

14. FEELEY& RUBLN,supra note 5, at 55-74.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Finney v. Hutto, 410F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark.
1976); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970).
18. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 364; FEELEY& RUBINsupra note 5, at 66-73.
19. See FEELEY
& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 51-79.
20. See id. at 55-73.
21. Seeid.at211-90.
22. See id.
23. When Judge Henley was confronted with a challenge to the arbitrary infliction of corporeal
punishment,
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authorizes action.24Third, the court must be able to formulate a "coordinating
idea" or coherent philosophy providing the framework for action.25Finally,
a judge confronted with an issue or a problem must be able to access the
knowledge or information necessary to create a solution.26
The motivation for intervention in the prison system was, in part,
provided by the civil rights movement of the 1960's." Judges received letters
.~~
from inmates describing the ghastly conditions of their c ~ n f i n e m e n t Many
of the prisoners were African-Americans imprisoned in facilities run by white
guards.29The conditions began to appear out of step with the civilization the
United States government was trying to build outside the prison system--out
of step with the civil rights movement and out of step with progress.30 The
racial divide between those who were serving time and those who supervised
the punishment emphasized the cruel and backward nature of the confinement.
There was a disparity between the conditions of the prisoners-about which
the judges were becoming better and better informed-and the direction in
which the rest of the nation was moving. At a time when the country was
moving towards integration, equality and prosperity for all citizens, life in
prison was mired in racism and oppression. The more the judges knew about
the world behind bars, the more they were motivated to i n t e ~ e n e . ~ '
As to the second requirement, a grant of jurisdiction authorizing
intervention,Feeley and Rubin suggest that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
like the growth of First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of the prison
The
religious discrimination decisions, provided the necessary f~undation.~'

[tlhe dominant image of the South [in the 1960'sI was of a troubled, backward region in resentful
'
transition, a region of red-necked sheriffs, segregation academies, police dogs, fire hoses, grinding
poverty, and the murderers of Martin Luther King, Medgar Evers, and those New York civil rights '
. workers. Federal judges probably felt more personally motivated to displace southern institutions
than at any time since the early days of Reconstruction.
Id. at 221.
24. See id. at 207. 'The first force. . . that acts upon judges when they are creating new doctrine
is existing legal doctrine-not a particular text, but existing doctrine as a whole." Id. at 213.
25. See id. at 233.
26. See id. at 162-67 (stating that the Berger Court would have overturned the prison decisions
without the information in the national standards upon which the court relied).
27. Id. at 159.
28. Id. at 150.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 221.
31. Id.
32. Id.at 14-15. 171.206-07.
Over a period of about five years, [Judge Henley] gradually r e a l i d that the totality of the
conditions in the prison could be regarded as a generalized violation of the Eighth Amendment.
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Eighth Amendment opened a doorway permitting scrutiny of prison conditions
and application of constitutional principles to sentenced prisoners.
The third condition for judicial activism is the ability to frame what
Feeley and Rubin term a "coordinating ideaw-a judicial philosophy or theme
to ground a specific decision.33Judge Henley developed two. One was the
and the other was that the
idea that prisons must provide rehabilitati~n~~
supervision of prisoners must be bureaucratized rather than arbitrary.35Judge
Henley held that if a prison rule were not designed to rehabilitate, it could not
This insight gave form and organization to his
be con~titutional.~~
intervention. Through that prism, he could look at any aspect of prison life
from employment, to disciplinary rules, to visitation and access to the courts,
and ask whether the prison rule served the goal of rehabilitation.
Even with a coordinating idea, courts need information to actualize a
notion of fairness. The development of standards for the administration of
prisons provided the information necessary to implement reform. The
American Correctional Association ("ACA") published a Manual of
Correctional Standards in 1946.37 In 1959, the ACA published a second
edition that "contained a new chapter entitled 'Legal Rights of Probationers,
Prisoners and Parolees' . . . [which] enumerated a set of 'legal rights' for
prisoners, actually policy standards drawn from various international
sources."38 Distributed in a usable, readable, and comprehensive form, the
standards rendered the abstract notion of cruel and unusual punishment
justiciable by providing the courts with concrete guidance about appropriate
correctional behavior.39

This enabled him to bypass the complex and perhaps insuperable task of matching specific
conditions with specific constitutional provisions, or of defining particularized rights that prisoners
possessed.
Id. at 226.
33. See id. at 226-33, 242. Once a court finds the moral imperative and the doctrinal authority
justifying intervention, it must locate guidelines for action. There are a variety of ways to decide cases
when there is little controlling precedent. Judges use analogies and metaphors and they listen to public
policy arguments. Feeley and Rubin suggest that, in addition, courts can imagine a theoretical framework
to explain their decision. See id. at 237-41.
34. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362,378-81 (E.D. Ark. 1970).
35. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683,689 (E.D. Ark. 1965).
36. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 379.
37. FEELEY& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 163.
38. Id. at 163.
OF CORRECTIONAL
STANDARDS
266-79 (3d ed. 1966) at Part III
39. AM. CORR.ASS'N,MANUAL
Chapter 15; see also FEELEY& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 163 (noting that Chapter 15 is a new addition to
the manual).
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Once a framework for intervention was modeled, judges across the
country eagerly applied the Constitution to prisons, ending brutal practice^.^'
The judges were undaunted by the fact that their decisions would cost money
and could be attacked as an arrogation of the legislative function. They were
not intimidated by the traditional argument that courts do not have sufficient
expertise to become involved in the management of prisons. Judges were
asked to intervene to end brutal practices in prisons, and they did.41Often the
cases could not be decided with a simple order. In those cases, judges used
innovative techniques to manage the litigation-techniques more typically
employed by administrative agencies rather than courtsP2 Most radical was
the use of special masters-powerful "special assistants9'-who investigated
conditions and oversaw the implementation of ordersP3Further, followingthe
lead of Monroe v. P a ~ e ; ~the judges used their injunctive
powers-"enjoin[ing] prison administrators from maintaining any feature of
the prison that failed to meet the rehabilitative standard."45 Finally, judges
retained jurisdiction over the litigation, sometimes for years, to ensure that the
changes they desired were im~lernented.4~
Courts that are asked to reform criminal defense delivery systems today
are in much the same position as was Judge Henley in 1965. Exonerations of
the innocent and exposCs of malpractice by defense counsel in even the most
serious prosecutions provide motivation for judicial intervention. Moreover,
the job of improving indigent defense systems is uniquely suited to the
judiciary. Courts are aware of the deficiencies in the delivery of criminal
defense services.4' Judges preside over criminal trials and pleas. They are

40. FEELEY& RUBIN,
supra note 5, at 39-40 ("In the five-year period after the Arkansas case was
decided, federal courts declared prisons in Mississippi, Oklahoma, Florida, Louisiana, and Alabama to be
unconstitutional, in whole or part. Five years after that, prisons or prison systems in twenty-eight more
jurisdictions had been added to this lugubrious list. . . ."). Id.
41. See generally MUSHLIN,
supra note 10, 5 2.04, at 52 (commenting that "formal corporeal
punishment has virtually disappeared from the correctional scene . . ." and discussing the effect of the
Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1.4-5 (1992)).
42. See generally MUSHLIN,
supra note 10, 8 2.14, at 117-19 (discussing remedies).
43. See id. at 75 ("The power to appoint a compliance coordinator, more familiarly known as a
special master, is traditionally regarded as an inherent power of an equity court and is explicitly authorized
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.").
44. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
45. FEELEY& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 256.
46. The Arkansas prison system was subject to Judge Henley and later Judge Eisle's jurisdiction for
a total of seventeen years. See id. at 51-79.
JONATHANLIPPMAN,CHIEFADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGE
&HONORABLE
JUANITABING
47. HONORABLE
NEWON,DEPUTYCHIEFADMINISTRATIVE
JUDGE,
ASSIGNED
COUNSEL
COMPENSATION
PLANIN NEW
YORK:A GROWING
CRISIS(Jan. 2000) [hereinafter ASSIGNED
COUNSELREPORT] (on file with the Oftice
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confronted by crowded calendars, hasty pleas and badly tried cases. Judges
understand the role of the criminal defense lawyer and the significance of a
zealous defense. Ultimately the courts are responsible for the administration
The unique
of justice, not simply in individual cases,48but also ~ystemically.~~
role of the judiciary in supervising "justice," combined with the welldocumented inadequaciesof institutional defense services provide motivation
for judicial intervention.
New tools exist to assist judges in formulating effective and far-reaching
rulings about the inadequacies of criminal defense counsel. Until recently,
courts faced with claims of constitutionally infirm public defense services
lacked a functional definition of effective assistance of counsel that could be
applied prospectively and systemically. The traditional, accepted way of
measuring effectiveness of counsel in criminal cases is to review the
. ~ ~ a particular attorney's work on a
representation after its c ~ m p l e t i o n Thus,
specific case would be examined only after the conviction or appeal and only
in relation to the results of the attorney's efforts. If the conviction were
supported by the trial evidence, the attorney's performance generally would
be deemed effective." Thus, the Strickland standard asks a reviewing court
to focus almost exclusively on case outcomes.
However, if courts are concerned only with outcomes, they are more
likely to be satisfied with a lawyer's efforts so long as his or her clients
receive the "market" value for their cases.52 An after-the-fact approach

I

of Court Administration).
48. To be sure, courts have an arsenal of tools that could be aimed at improving the defense
function. Judges are often aware that an individual assigned counsel or public defender is performing
poorly for a client. When that occurs, the court may threaten the lawyer with sanctions, report the
inadequaciesto the appropriate administrativebody, or substitute one counsel for another. Such action may
or may not improve the lot of the particular defendant, but it most certainly does not affect broader change.
49. CfiN.Y. LAW$5 460-96 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 2001) (courts have the inherent power to
regulate the practice of law-as reflected by the statutes, such as New York's Judiciary Law, which delegate
to the courts the authority to determine the qualifications for admission to practice).
50. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (reviewing an ineffective
representation claim after the defendant had been convicted of the charges against him).
51. See id. discussed further infra at note 110, and accompanying text.
52. In any jurisdiction all cases have what the author refers to as a particular "market" value.
"Market" value changes as it is affected by the fluctuating political priorities. If a neighborhood has
recently complained about the presence of prostitutes on its streets, a local district attorney may respond
by recommending tougher plea bargains to all arrested prostitutes, hoping that stricter sentences will force
the trade into another part of town. The crackdown on prostitution will alter the "market value" of a
prostitution case in that district attorney's jurisdiction. If all prostitutes are sentenced to thirty days in jail,
then the court will believe that any prostitute who is sentencedto that number of days has been presumably
effectively represented. Likewise the courts will believe that an attorney can effectively represent a large
number of prostitutes very quickly so long as each one receives a sentence of thirty days.
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minimizes the value of much of what an attorney does for a client during the
pendency of the case. It devalues the time the attorney might spend explaining
the charges to a client, investigating a drug treatment alternative to jail, or
inquiring about care for the client's children during the jail term-let alone
planning a challenge to the arresting officer's credibility.
Although some commentators have discussed using other kinds' of
standards to evaluate attorney performance, the idea has not generated much
e~citement.'~
Part of the reason for the lack of progress has been the difficulty
of adapting existing performance standards to the task of e ~ a l u a t i o n . ~ ~
Another part of the reason might be the reticence of the defense community
to accept the idea that their professional role could be reduced to a set of
skills, tasks, or competencies. Finally, part of the reason is likely that defense
attorneys themselves tend to devalue all lawyering skills other than those
which seem particularly necessary to a "good" outcome-e.g. a scathing
cross-examination or a particularly comfortable knack for plea-bargaining.

53. There is wide-spread support for adoption and implementation of eligibility
standards-especially in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense
Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND.L.
REV.495 (1996) (discussing Indiana's rule attempting to provide more effective representation in such
cases); Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination andAnalysis of State
Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defendants, 37 WM.&MARYL. REV.
1617 (1996) (arguing that states should organize units specializing in representationof indigent defendants
supra note 10. A few commentators have suggested evaluating
in capital cases). See also MUSHLIN,
attorney effectiveness with performance standards. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Purify Standard, 88 J. CRIM.L. &CRIMINOLOGY
242,286-306 (1997)
(arguing for the implementationof an ex ante standard for determining effectivenessof counsel in indigent
defense cases) [hereinafter Ex Ante Standard]; William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of
Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM.CRIM.L. REV. 181 (1984)
(discussing how performance standards might improve the quality of criminal defense representation
generally, and why they should replace the Strickland standard in case-by-case determinations of appeals
for ineffectivenessof counsel); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a ChecklistBased Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO.L.J. 413 (1988) (to the
same effect); Ex Anre Standard, supra (suggesting that institutional reform litigation, as well as the review
of criminal individual cases, would benefit from a prospective (ex ante) approach to the evaluation of
effectivenesswhere the standards would be parity a comparison of the resources of the defender office with
the resources enjoyed by their adversaries-the prosecutors). Even Judge Bazelon used a standards-based
app'roach to evaluate attorney effectiveness in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C.
Cir. 1973). rev'd by 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Chief Judge Bazelon used the ABA Standards and
SEGALAND MILLER'STRIAL
MANUAL
FOR THE DEFENSE
OF CRIMINAL
CASESto define
AMSTERDAM,
ineffectiveness. Id. at 1203 nn.27,28. His efforts were soundly rejected by the Circuit. See DeCoster, 624
F.2d at 205.
54. The various types of standards-performance. eligibility, and administration-as well as their
particular strengths and weaknesses are discussed infra Part IV.
-

-

- -
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There is evidence, however, that defense attorneys today see their roles
differently than did their predecessors twenty-five years ago.55New defender
offices are emphasizing a holistic approach to client repre~entation,~~
and the
federal government is encouraging this development by funding alternative
courts and supporting defense lawyers who focus on client treatment and
di~ersion.~'
At the same time, the defense community has been increasinglyinterested
in standards. Assigned Counsel Plans are adopting "Eligibility Standards"
detailing the experience and training required for assignment to particular
classes of cases.58"Performance Standards" describe case preparation tasks.59
"Administration Standards" guide the operation of institutional provider^.^'
This interest has coincided with an invigorated regard for a wide range of
clients' pre-trial due process rights.

55. See generally Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young
433
Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV.L. & SOC. CHANGE
(1994-1995) (suggesting that defenders and the entire criminal justice system should learn more about the
clients andtheir personal histories so that juries can see crime in context and be given an opportunity to
empathize with defendants as well as with victims).
56. See, e.g., Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the
Institutional Boundaries of Providing Defense Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO.J. LEGALETHICS
401,427-58
(2001) (discussing many examples, including, The Bronx Defenders, a new contract office in New York
City, that sends its staff attorneys into the schools to explain the value of criminal defense, provides free
AIDS and HIV testing to clients, and makes its extensive social work services available to clients).
57. The federal government has been instrumental in supporting "problem-solving" courts where
persons arrested for crimes are diverted into treatment and community service. See, e.g., DRUGCOURT
CLEARMG
HOUSEAND TECHNICAL
ASSISTANCE
PROJECT,
DRUGCOURTS
PROGRAM
OFFICE,OFF~CE
OF
JUSTICEPROGRAMS,
U.S. DEP'TOFJUSTICE,LOOKINGATADECADEOFDRUGCOURTS
(last visited Nov. 12,
2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpo/decade98.htm;ERICLEE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
AN EVOLVINGMODEL,
available at http:Nwww.ncjrs.org.pdffilesl/bja/l83452.pdf
COMMUNITY
COURTS:
(2000). In these courts, characteristically judges, prosecutors and defenders must work together, as
collaborators not adversaries, to formulate solutions to defendants' problems. The "problem-solving"
approach may educate the courts to the importance of case processing.
58. In recent years, standards for defense services have proliferated. The Institute for Law and
Justice, supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice, has just
published electronicallya Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems which includes a broad
range of standards. INSTITUTE
FOR LAWAND JUSTICE,
Compendium of Standards For Indigent Defense
Systems, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendiuwelcome.htd (2000)
FOR THE ADMINISTRATION
OF ASSIGNED
COUNSEL
SYSTEMS
[hereinafter Compendium]. STANDARDS
(National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n 1989).
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE:PROSECUTION
FUNCTION
AND DEFENSE
59. Compendium; STANDARDS
FUNCTION
(1993).
60. ~ o n t ~ e n d i u m
GUIDELMES
;
FOR LEGAL
DEFENSE
SYSTEMS
IN THE UNITEDSTATES(National
FOR ALL ORGANIZED PROVIDERS
OF
Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n 1976); GENERAL
REQUIREMENTS
DEFENSE
SERVICES
TO INDIGENT
DEFENDANTS
(New York City Indigent Defense Org. Oversight Cornm.
1997).
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The development and implementation of standards for the delivery of
defense services is both a reflection of the changing conception of defense
'
only do performance standards
work and a trigger for ~ h a n g e . ~ Not
incorporate a broad range of lawyering skills as essential components of the
defense function, but the very process of developing standards (whether
performance, eligibility or administration standards) suggests the business of
providing defense services is becoming more organized, methodical, and
ultimately more amenable to evaluation. Although standards may serve
multiple other purposeslb2they also provide courts with a better measure for
evaluating defense delivery systems than a measure that 'considers only
outcomes. Standards make challenges to defense delivery systems more
justiciable.
Additionally, today sufficient precedent exists to .support judicial
intervention. Lawsuits brought by attorneys asserting their own constitutional
rights have paved the way for claims asserting the rights of defendants to
quality defense services.63 Challenges to underfunded and overburdened
public defenders, assigned counsel programs, and contract providers have
been mounted successfully in a number of jurisdictions-both rural and
urban.@ This litigation has pushed courts to re-consider the meaning of
constitutionally "effective" representation and to recognize that effective
assistance of counsel can be measured prospectively by looking at working
conditions and pre-trial p r e p a r a t i ~ n . ~ ~
In this article, I first, suggest that the current deplorable state of criminal
defense services should provide a motivation for judicial action. Then, I
review the precedent providing the foundation for judicial action. In the third
section, I discuss the standards applicable to defense services. In the final
section, I speculate about the changing role of the criminal defense attorney
and how that evolution might hasten judicial action.

61. Compendium; Performance, eligibility and administration standardsarediscussed infra Part N.
62. Standards can be used to educate the public and funding sources about what it takes to provide
quality defense services, to provide notice to the organizations of what is expected of a publically funded
defense office, and as an internal training tool for the lawyers employed in a defense organization. Adele
Bernhard, Private Bar Monitors Public Defense, A.B.A. CRIM.JUST. MAG.,Spring 1998, at 25-30.
63. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 .
64. See discussion infra Part m.B.
65. See discussion infra Part III.
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11. MOTIVATION
FOR INTERVENTION: INSTITUTIONALIZED
INEFFECTIVENESS

Most people arrested and charged with a criminal offense are too poor to
hire their own counsel.66 Since 1963, courts have guaranteed counsel,
appointed free of charge, to everyone charged with a crime punishable by loss
of libert~.~'Organizing the provision of these essential services to the
millions arrested each year@' has been a daunting task, made more difficult by
the judicial resistance to actively ensuring effective or meaningful
a s ~ i s t a n c eand
, ~ ~by the public's lack of support for the f~nction.'~Defense
services for the poor are structured either as assigned counsel plans, private
for-profit or not-for-profit law firms with government contracts to provide
services, or public defender offices. The quality of services provided varies
tremendously.
A. Assigned Counsel Plans
Assigned counsel, private practitioners who are paid by the hour from
public funds, represent the majority of people arrested in this country.71To
be appointed to cases, assigned counsel attorneys generally are required to do

66. In many jurisdictions, public or assigned defenders represent the overwhelming majority-as
many as 90%--of those arrested. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense
Systems in the United States, 58 LAW&CONTEMP.
PROBS.31,31-32 (1995). CAROLINE
WOLFHARLOW,
JUSTICE,
DEFENSE
COUNSEL
IN CRIMINALCASES
(2000) (reportingthat in 1996courtU.S. DEPARTMENTOF
appointed counsel represented 82% of all persons charged with a felony in the 75 largest counties in the
country).
67. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel is
fundamentalfor a fair trial); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment
guarantees the right to counsel to all indigent criminal defendants).
OF CRIMINALJUSTICESTATISTICS
68. BUREAUOF JUSTICESTATISTICS,SOURCEBOOK
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooW1995/pdf/t549.pdf(last updated Sept. 19, 2001) (in 1996 there were
approximately one million felony and eight million misdemeanor arrests in the United States).
69. Judicial reluctance to enforce Sixth Amendment rights in a meaningful way has taken many
forms. Most important has been the Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984). which many commentators blame for judicial acceptance of egregiously deficient lawyering. See,
e.g., Klein, supra note 4 (arguing that Strickland will be negative precedent); Richard Klein, The
Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals
for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV.531, 564-65 (1988) ("Strickland's impact on the ability of an ineffectively
represented defendant to overturn the subsequent conviction is devastating.").
70. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defenderfor the 21st Century, 58 LAW&
CONTEMP.
PROBS.81,86-87 (Winter 1995).
7 1. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 66, at 3 1.
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no more than put their names on a list. Neither experience nor qualifications
beyond admission to the bar are reviewed and participation in training
programs is not required. Recertification is not necessary. Competence is
never reviewed. Membership lasts forever. Attorneys stop taking assignments
when it suits them.72 Often, as in Texas, judges administer the plans and,
without any standards or rules, choose which attorneys will be assigned to
cases.73 As a result, tens of thousands of poor people in this country,
particularly in rural counties, are represented by attorneys whose competence
to handle cases-serious or minor-has never been subject to peer review and
who are assigned to their clients by the judges who will 1) preside over the
case; 2) pass on their requests for attorney fees; and 3) decide whether they
will have access to investigators and experts.74
In organized plans administered by an independent manager, rather than
by the presiding judge, attorneys generally must meet specific skill and
knowledge criteria to be assigned to certain types of cases.75Administrators
screen candidates, rotate assignments, and try to insulate attorneys from
judicial influence and pressure. However, even in those plans, attorneys must
seek court approval for expert andinvestigative services, as well as for their
own fees.76Busy calendar judges managing full dockets have an incentive to
resolve cases, and the quickest resolution is generally a plea bargain. Judges
are often less than generous in permitting the hire of investigative services for
cases that they have a strong interest in resolving quickly, or in approving fees

72. InNew YorkCity in the mid-1990's, the Presiding Judgeof the AppellateDivision First Judicial
Department (with jurisdiction over the Bronx and Manhattan) required all Assigned Counsel Plan lawyers
qualified to handle felony cases to re-apply to the panel. The re-certification process, which took over five
years and required thousands of hours of volunteer attorney time, eliminated approximately 200 (10%) of
the plan lawyers-presumably those who were the least qualified. As far as I know, this remains the only
such effort to re-evaluate assigned counsel plan lawyers subsequent to their acceptance onto a panel.
Interview with Norman Reimer, Esq., chair of thqAssigned Counsel Screening Committee during the reapplication process.
73. ALLAN K. BUTCHER
& MICHAEL
K. MOORE,MUTINGGIDEON'STRUMPET:THE CRISISIN
INDIGENTCRIMINALDEFENSE
~NTEXAS,
available at http://uta.edu/pols/moordindigentllast.d (Sept. 22,
2000); TEXAS APPLESEED
FAIRDEFENSEPROJECT,THE FAIR DEFENSEREPORT: FINDINGS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS
O F I N D I G E N TDEFENSE PRACTICESI N TEXAS, available at
http://www.appleseeds.net~tx/Fair_DefenseRptFindingsand%2ORommendations.pdf
(Dec. 2000);
Moore, supra note 53, at 1635-36 (reporting that, in Texas, judges appoint lawyers even to capital cases
based on 'subjective criteria' such as friendship or political support).
&MOORE,supra note 73.
74. See BUTCHER
75. Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent
Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM.L. &CRIMINOLOGY
176, 177-78
(1985).
76. See, e.g., ASSIGNED
COUNSEL
REPORT,supra note 47.
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necessitated by time spent conducting legal research that the judge may
Attorneys themselves are sometimes hesitant to push
believe is unnece~sary.~~
aggressively for services on behalf of a client who will likely end up pleading
guilty once the pre-trial work has been completed. No one wants to look as
though he or she is wasting time and money. The attorney is caught between
obligations to the court and to the client. When the client is not paying, and
may be morally unattractive, emotionally or mentally disabled, and
uncooperative, it is hardly surprising that an assigned attorney would feel a
keen desire to please the court to which he or she returns each day. This
tension creates a powerful conflict for the assigned counsel who may fear that
mounting a zealous defense will endanger regular appointment^.^^
Independence and zealous advocacy can be c ~ m p r o m i s e d . ~ ~
Moreover, assigned counsel plan lawyers are frequently paid at rates so
low that only lawyers who are beginning their practice or those who were
previously unsuccessful in the business of law will agree to take
assignment^.'^ In New YorkCity, lawyers who accepted court appointed, noncapital, criminal cases in the state courts in 2001 were paid at the rate of
twenty-five dollars for an hour of out-of-court time and forty dollars for an
hour of in-court time-less than they would have been paid in Alabama for the
same work.8' The low rates force attorneys, who make their living through

& MOORE,supra note 73.
77. See BUTCHER
78. See id.
79. Dripps, supra note53, at 252-54 (describingthe pressure on publically funded defenders as dual:
horizontal pressure caused by the incentive to dispose of some cases in order to have more time for others;
vertical pressure caused by the incentive to please the funding source).
80. ASSIGNED COUNSEL
REPORT,supra note 47, "Inasmuch as the current assigned counsel rates
do not even meet law practice overhead costs in many areas of [New York State], it is no surprise that
attorneys are either removing their names from assigned counsel panels, remaining on the panels but
refusing to take assignments, or showing no interest in involving themselves in assigned counsel work at
all," id. at 9; Albert L. Vreeland, 11, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH.L. REV.626,643 (1991) ('The appointed
counsel system has been roundly criticized for its failure to attract qualified counsel and its reliance on
younger, inexperienced attorneys. . . .").
81. N.Y. COUNTY
L. ART. 18-B increased the fees to twenty-five dollars and forty dollars in 1986;
see also THESPANGENBERG
GROUP,RATESOF COMPENSATION
PAIDTO COURTAPPO~NTED
COUNSEL
NON-CAPITALFELONY
CASESATTRIAL:
A STATE-BY-STATE
OVERVIEW
(Oct. 1997) (noting that Alabama
pays fifty dollars per hour for in-court work and thirty dollars per hour for out-of-court work). Since 1986
in New York City where rates for assigned counsel in criminal and family court cases have been frozen for
sixteen years at the punishingly low rate of twenty-five dollars an hour for out-of-court and forty dollars for
in-court counsel time, the courts are rebelling. As family court lawyers increasingly refuse to take on new
matters at those rates, some family court judges have unilaterally decided to pay attorneys seventy-five
dollars an hour, despite the statute. See, e.g., Anthony S. v. Patricia S. (Fam. Ct. Dutchess County),
published in N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 2001, at 32 (implying that the statutory limit is inadequate).
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assigned cases, to accept a large volume of cases, to limit out-of-court time
(preparing motions, conducting investigations, and researching the law), and
to minimize expenses-responses antithetical to effective representation.".
Assigned counsel plans that underpay drive the most conscientious lawyers
away from indigent defense
In addition to. low hourly rates, many state or county assigned counsel
systems reimburse no more than a maximum number of hours-even on
capital cases.84 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, limits
lawyers to one hundred fifty hours on a capital case--despite the fact that a
local state bar association committee found that it takes between four hundred
and nine hundred hours of time to prepare such cases a d e q ~ a t e l y . ~ ~

B. Fixed Price Contract Providers
The greatest problems with inadequate defense counsel are created by
low-bid fixed-price contracts where a law firm agrees to accept all
Zssignments arising in a given jurisdiction, over a set period of time, at a fixed
price. Attractive to governments concerned with containing costs and
accurately predicting expenditures, fixed-price contracts risk reduced quality
provided to defendants, especially when contracts are awarded through
competitive bidding. Death penalty lawyer Stephen Bright has noted that,
"[mlany jurisdictions process the maximum number of cases at the lowest
possible cost without regard to justice."86 He describes one particularly
striking example of low-bid contracting that occurred in McDuffie County,
Georgia. In that county, the county commission hired attorney Bill Wheeler,
whose $25,000 bid for the year was almost $20,000 lower than the next
closest contender, to handle all local criminal cases in the county.87After four

82. Vreeland, supra note 80, at 644-45. See also Michael McConville &Chester Mirsky, Criminal
581,696-902 (1986-87) (discussing
Defense of the Poor in New York, 15 N.Y.U.REV. L. &SOC. CHANGE
the practices of appointed counsel and comparing these practices with those of the Legal Aid Society).
83. Victoria Rivkin, 18-B: A System Overloaded-Experts Say Lack of Respect, Low Pay Cause
Exodus in System for Assigning Counsel, N.Y. L.J., June 15,2000, at 1.
84. N.Y. COUNTY
L.ART. 18-B, 8 722-b. The caps set by statute in New York are $1,200 for a
felony, $800 for a non-felony and $2,400 for a capital case. These limitations may be exceeded upon a
showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id.
85. Bright, supra note 4, at 807.
86. Id. at 788.
87. Id.
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years of contract service, Wheeler tried only three cases and filed only three
motions, but entered 3 13 guilty pleas.88

C. Public Defense Offices
Public defender programs have the best chance of delivering adequate
services. "When adequately funded and staffed, defender organizations
employing full-time personnel are capable of providing excellent defense
service^."'^ Generally, a public defender is a public or private not-for-profit
organization staffed by attorneys whose exclusive responsibility is handling
criminal cases. In large public defender offices, attorneys are trained,
supervised, and supported by investigators, paralegals and clerical staff. The
attorneys develop considerable e~pertise.~'
However, no matter how effective the structure, inadequate funding
adversely affects all defense system^.^' When budgets are tight, defense
organizations make difficult decisions about how to spend their funds?2 Staff
vacancies are not filled and caseloads rise. Social workers and investigatoi-s
shoulder too many assignments and spend insufficient time working with
individual clients. Everyone on staff selects among individuals represented
by the office and compromises on services. Lawyers are compelled to spend
more time in court, answering calendar calls on behalf of their greater number
of clients, and less time in the field or in the 1ibra1-y.'~Lawyers who carry too
~
decisions in
many cases inevitably pressure clients to plead g ~ i l t y . ' Crucial
cases are made on the basis of too little fact in~estigation.~'

88. Id. at 789.
89. ABA, CRIMINAL
JUSTICESTANDARDS
COMMITTEE,
STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE:
PROVIDING
DEFENSE
SERVICES,
at Commentary to Standard 5-1.2. (3d ed. 1992).
90. See Ogletree, supra note 70, at 85.
91. See generally Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 66 (noting that inadequate funding results
in excessive caseloads and inexperienced counsel).
92. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice,
107 YALEL.J. 1,35-44 (1997).
93. In New York City, the Indigent Defense OrganizationOversight Committee, a committee of the
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, with the responsibility to
evaluate defense services provided by the providers other than the assigned counsel program (discussed in
detail infra at note 265 and accompanying text) found in its Report for 1997 that a reduction in funding
caused the Legal Aid Society in New York City to ''handle too many cases with too little staff' and that
"clients are not receiving the services they deserve." INDIGENT DEFENSEORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT
C O M M ~ Report
E , for 1997, 17 (1998) (available from the Appellate Division, First Department).
94. Klein, supra note 4, at 672-73.
95. Id. (reporting that a study of the plea bargaining process in Boston discovered that the
Massachusetts Defender Committee depends on plea bargaining to avoid trials which the office would be
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Lack of funding for the defense function is certainly the single greatest
factor adversely affecting quality.96Nonetheless, responding to the perceived
anti-crime attitude of the voting public, state legislatures have skimped on
financial support for the defen~e.~'Efforts to convince legislators to spend
more on defense have been remarkably unsuccessful." 8 some localities
defense attorneys have tried to enlist other participants in the criminal justice
system--departments of correction, prosecutors and court administrators-to
assist in pressing the case for increased funding to local legislator^.^^ 8
others, defenders have urged the creation of special commissions to study and
make recommendations to the state legislators.loo Groups of defense lawyers,

unable to provide and that the larger the area served by the agency, the more excessive the caseloads). As
attorney caseloads increase, so do guilty plea rates. Id. Ih 2000 in New York City, Assigned Counsel
Lawyers handled 177,965 new defendants in the Bronx and Manhattan, 124,177 of those cases were
disposed of at the first appearanc-most
by a plea of guilty entered after no more than a ten-minute
consultation with their lawyers. REPORTOFTHE
ASSIGNEDCOUNSELPLAN
ADMINISTRATORFORTHEFIRST
DEPARTMENT
FOR FISCALYEARI998 (on file with the author).
96. See generally Douglas W . Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Undeended Indigent Defense Services
andArbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF.L. REV.329 (1995) (discussing the responsibilities of appointed
attorneys, the problem of underfunding these defense systems, and the death penalty).
97. COLE,supra note 1; Stuntz, supra note 92, at 4 ("As courts have raised the cost of criminal
investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those costs. Severe limits on
defense funding are the most obvious example, but not the only one."). See generally Dripps, supra note
1 (discussing the proposition that legislatures generally prefer limited restrictions on law enforcement
mechanisms).
98. As mentioned earlier, supra note 81, in New York State assigned counsel rates have not been
increased since 1986 despite yearly lobbying efforts. In 1999, for example, the New York State League of
Women Voters and the New York State Defenders Association, a not-for-profit organization that provides
research, training and technical support for defenders, sponsored a series of hearings on the stateof criminal
defense services in an unsuccessful attempt to convince the state legislature to raise the assigned counsel
rates for family and criminal court cases. Each year a group of lawyers from across the state travel to the
state capital in an effort to raise fees. So far there has been no action. John Caher, Coalition of Lawyers
Protests Low Assigned Counsel Fees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2000, at 1, col. 3.
99. The Federal Deprutment of Justice has heavily supported these efforts to improve services
through collaboration. The Department of Justice has sponsored two symposia on indigent defense where
representatives of defender organizations, prosecutorial agencies and members of the courts were paid to
travel to Washington D.C. and work together in small teams envisioning ways to improve the quality of
defense services. DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE,
Indigent Defense-Publications-Paper and Otherwise,
available at http://www.ojp.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2001).
100. Cf. The Spangenberg Group, 2000 State Legislative Scorecard: Developments Affecting
Indigent Defense, THESPANGENBERG
REPORT,Nov. 2000, at 6, 15 (reporting that
[i]n January 2000, the 25-member [sic] West Virginia Task Force recommended to the Governor
and Legislature that the budget for West Virginia Public Defender Services (PDS) be increased for
the specific purposes of: increasing salaries of PDS staff to competitive levels; hiring qualified
management-information systems staff; and operating an auditing division, resource center and
appellate division as required by [local] statute).
Earlier, the Group reported that the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Indigent Services Act
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both those assigned individually to cases and those employed by defense
organizations, have attempted collective action to raise salaries and improve
working conditions through strikes.I0l
Additional pro bono service provided by volunteer lawyers might relieve
some of the pressures on public defense,lo2but ethical obligations are
inadequate incentive for the private bar to contribute much in time or money
toward criminal defenses. Better training, monitoring, and evaluation of
defenders and defense systems will make a difference, but without additional
resources, only to a limited degree.

m.JURISDICTION:
USINGTHE SIXTHAMENDMENT
TO REFORMTHE
QUALITY
OF SERVICES
PROVIDED BY INSTITUTIONAL DEFENDERS

Legal challenges to the constitutionality of services supplied by
institutional criminal defense providers or assigned counsel plans have arisen
in two ways. On the one hand, lawyers have confronted fee structures and
assignment systems that require them to work for free or nearly so.Io3These
lawsuits have been more successful in protecting lawyers than in improving
lawyering services for clients. They are worth reviewing because it was in
this context that the courts found their inherent power to participate in the
administration of public defense services.
On the other hand, defendants,public defenders, bar associations, and law
reform organizations have attacked delivery systems for their allegedly
unconstitutional deprivation of defendants' Sixth Amendment right to
counsel.'04 There are only a handful of these decisions. Not every court
of 2000, which creates an independent agency in the state's judicial department to oversee and improve the
quality of defense services in that state. The Spangenberg Group, North Carolina Legislature Gives Green
Light to New Statewide Indigent Defense Program, THESPANGENBERG
REPORT,Aug. 2000, at 11, 11- 13.
101. James S. Kunen, No Justice for These Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, Oct. 8, 1994, at A2. See
Frances A. McMoms, Giuliani's Hard Line Breaks Strike at New York City Legal Services, WALLST. J.,
Oct. 6, 1994, at B11. See also FIT v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 41 1 (1990) (where
a group of attorneys who routinely represented indigent defendants refused to do so until the District of
Columbia increased their compensation for such work).
102. See David Rohde, Victory in Schools Suit Spotlights Need for Free Legal Work, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22,2001, at B3.
103. See discussion infra Part III.A.1.
104. Lf lobbying, public education campaigns, and efforts at collaboration fail to raise funds for the
defense function, litigation should be considered. Although funding and managing a complicated
constitutional claim can be daunting, a lawsuit has the potential to trigger change in a number of ways, even
pre-trial. Filing alone may generate publicity that educates the public and legislators. See, e.g., Michael
A Riccardi, Second Lawsuit ChallengesRule 18-B Fee Schedule, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22,2000, at 1 (discussing
a New York lawsuit challenging the compensation system for attorneys representing indigent defendants).
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confronted with a challenge to an overburdened public defense system has
agreed to construe a local statutory scheme for providing services.lo5 The
litigation presents a number of difficulties-both legal and political.
First, federal abstention doctrineIo6has forced litigation into state courts
which are more reticent policy-makers than federal court^.'^' Further, the
complexity of the issues and the breadth of potential solutions disincline
courts from undertaking problem-solving on a large scale.'08
Second, courts may have been dissuaded from taking action by the
unacknowledged but pervasive belief that anyone who has been arrested is
guilty-a belief which inevitably minimizes the significance of all else in the
criminal justice system besides the swift resolution of cases. The presumption
of guilt is a "core belief shared by virtually all personnel who work within the
criminal justice system"lo9 and a major hindrance to improving criminal
defense services.l1° If judges suspect that everyone arrested is guilty, it is hard
to convince them to strike as unconstitutional state-funded criminal defense
systems that rush pleas or discourage legal research and creative investigation.
Judges are not likely to order the expenditure of funds to hire lawyers and
support staff when convinced of guilt and worried that additional support will
only slow the process of adjudication not change results. Further, if judges

If the claim can survive a motion to dismiss, the state or county responsible for administering the plan may
decide to settle on favorable terms. That was the effect of litigation in Connecticut and Allegheny County,
Pennsylvania. See generally Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456299, 1996 WL 636475 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
105. See generally Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (see discussion infra at Section
III.B.2).
106. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (explaining the reluctance of federal courts to
issue injunctions regarding proceedings pending in state court) (see discussion infra at Section lII.B.4).
107. Whether elected or appointed, state court judges are naturally more sensitive to the approval of
politicians and the voting public than are federal judges who hold life tenure.
108. Student Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding of Judicial
Functions, 81 MICH.L. REV. 1687 (1983) (noting that because the Constitution allocates the power to
appropriate public funds to the legislature, courts hesitate to invoke the inherent power doctrine to compel
appropriations, even for the purposes of funding judicial operations).
109. Daniel Givelber,Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS
L. REV. 1317, 1329 (1997).
110. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH.L. REV. 1729, 1741 (1993)
(arguing that the presumption of guilt can be ascribed to the attractive, although frequently misguided,
conviction that police only arrest guilty people; even though the public will happily speculate about the
accuracy of a police investigation in a particular case, especially when the details of the case are highly
publicized and familiar, people generally believe that police arrest the guilty. "These predispositions can
be ascribed to several . . . causes: the basic feeling that where there's smoke, there's fire. . . ; [gratitude
to the police for protection against crime]; . . . obedience to authority and the well-known 'belief in a just
world. . . ."'). Id. (footnote omitted).
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focus exclusively on essentially ministerial closing of cases, it will continue
to be difficult to move them to care about sentencing, diversion or
rehabilitation - all of which require attention and time.
The presumption of guilt helps to explain why the Supreme Court
formulated an almost insurmountable standard of review for ineffective
assistance claims on appeal. In Strickland v. ~ashington,"'the Court held
that "[tlhe benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just
res~lt."''~In other words, egregiously negligent work will be excused if the
reviewing court is not convinced that a better effort would have produced a
different result.' l 3
The problem with the Strickland standard was captured by Justice
Marshall in dissent:
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent.
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel.
On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to
ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up against
rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.'14

The Strickland majority opinion overlooks the simple fact that the
prosecutor's evidence will always appear unassailable when counsel for the
accused neglects to conduct an investigation or fails to challenge the state's
version of the case. Ultimately, the decision deprives persons, against whom
the prosecution has collected persuasive evidence--even if that evidence is
misleading--of the right to effective assistance of counsel.' l5
Now that the explicit effects of inadequate lawyering have been
highlighted by research and media attention, courts should be less willing to
blindly ignore the ineffectiveness of the lawyers who appear before them116

111. 466 U.S.668 (1984).
112. Id. at 686.
113. See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD.L.
REV.1433, 1445-52 (1999) (discussing how the Strickland decision excuses the most excruciatingly
deficient representation by characterizing mistakes and omissions as tactics).
114. Strickland, 466 U.S.at 710.
115. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining
BILLRTS.J. 91,93 (1995).
of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM.&MARY
116. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950,964 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that despite the fact
that a lawyer slept through substantial portions of prosecution witness testimony in a capital murder trial,
the court could not presume constitutional ineffective assistance under Strickland).
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and motivated instead to improve the delivery of services. Existing doctrine
grounds judicial action.
A. Fee Litigation-Adequate Attorney's Fees
1. Fifh Amendment Rights of Counsel
Until the 1960s, state courts compelled attorneys to represent indigent
clients without compensation, as an obligation incidental to the privilege of
practicing law.'" As the task of representing the criminally accused grew,
assigned counsel began to argue that assignment without compensation was
a "taking" of private property for public use, a violation of due process, and
a denial of equal protection."' The "takings" cases provided a gateway for
court involvement in assuring quality defense services for the poor. Courts
that might have hesitated to intervene on behalf of defendants were willing to
assist the lawyers who practiced before them.
Beginning around 1965, perhaps in response to the changes wrought by
the Gideon1I9decision and the Warren Court's focus on the importance of
individual rights,Iz0lower courts began to listen to the "takings" arguments.
That year the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that members of the bar
should not be required to absorb the full cost of defending the poor.I2' New
Jersey pointed out that the burden of criminal assignments had increased, not
only in number, but also in complexity.~22As a result, the Court held that
taxpayers should share in the cost of representing the indigent. Fees paid for
assigned counsel work could be lower than market rate, but would "reimburse

117. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 187 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1963). There, the Court appointed counsel to
represent an indigent defendant on trial for murder. Id. at 761. After conviction, the trial judge directed
payment of $500, the maximum allowable under state law, to counsel. Id. The conviction was appealed;
the court ordered a new trial, but mid-way through the new trial, the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 761-62.
Counsel applied for additional fees, but the request was rejected. Id. at 762. Although the court agreed that
the $500 fee was inadequate for the services rendered, it held that the power to fix compensation was a
legislative prerogative. Id. at 762-63.
118. Vreeland, supra note 80.
119. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
120. See generally ROBERTG.
MCCU)SKEY,THE
AMERICAN
SUPREMECOURT
148-73 (2d ed. 1994)
(discussing Court decisions regarding civil rights, freedom of speech, protection of criminal defendants,
gender and equal protection). McCloskey noted that the Warren Court selectively incorporated "most of
the criminal-procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on the
states." Id. at 158.
121. State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441,448 (N.J. 1966).
122. Id.
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assigned counsel for his overhead and yield something toward his own
supp~rt."l~~
In 1976,the West Virginia Supreme Court agreed that requiring attorneys
to represent the indigent could be an unconstitutional "taking."'24 The Court
held that when an attorney has so many appointments that it interferes with his
ability to "engage in the remunerative practice of law," or that the costs
associated with such defenses substantially "reduce the attorney's net income
. ..the requirements must be considered confiscatory and unc~nstitutional."~~~
By 1987, the majority of courts were conceding that the cost of
representing the indigent should be shared between the public and the bar.Iz6
But once state courts reached consensus that attorneys must be paid fairly to
represent the indigent-something less than market value but something more
than a 'confiscatory' rate-the fee litigation strategy faltered as a mechanism
for prompting change. Arguments addressing the rights of attorneys to be free
from compelled and uncompensated labor could not be refocused to assert the
rights of the accused to effective counsel.
Litigation in Kansas illustrates the difficulty with the fee litigation
Orville J . Cole, an experienced trial lawyer,
strategy. In Stephan v.
was appointed to represent three separate indigent defendants in their
~
thereafter, he petitioned the appointing
individual criminal ~ a s e s . " Shortly
court to relieve him because the maximum permitted compensation was'
insufficient to cover even his minimum office costs, and because he feared
that inadequate compensation would affect his ability to provide effective

123. Id. at 448.
124. State ex re[. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (W. Va. 1976).
125. Id. at 319.
126. See DeLisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987). There, the attorney appointed to represent
the defendant in a child sexual abuse case refused to proceed, arguing lack of competency to handle a
criminal case, and that requiring him to represent the defendant without "reasonable compensation"
constituted "a taking of private property for public use." Id. at 438-39. On appeal from the contempt
citation, the SupremeCourt of Alaska reversed. Id. The court rejected the competency argument, but held
that an attorney cannot be forced to represent a client for free as a condition of his license to practice law.
Id. See also People v. Johnson, 417 N.E.2d 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the trial court abused
its discretion by awarding the court-appointed attorney less than eight dollars per hour); Hulse v. Wifvat,
306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981) (eliminating fixed fees and allowing courts to compensate attorneys for
reasonable and necessary time); State v. Boyken, 637 P.2d 1193 (Mont. 1981) (holding that awarding fees
lower than overhead costs constituted an abuse of discretion); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757
(Mo. 1985) (holding that a court cannot require an attorney to represent a client without compensation).
127. 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987).
128. Id. at 821.
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representation.Iz9 He recognized that the rate of compensation created a
conflict between his needs and those of his client.130
The local trial court consolidated the case with another similar assigned
counsel matter and held evidentiary hearings.13' At the close of the hearings,
the court filed an order establishing new rules and panels for indigent defense
services, in addition to requiring that counsel be paid reasonably.I3' To
implement the ruling, the court declared any person not represented by an
assigned counsel within thirty days would be presumed to have received
ineffective assistance of counsel-a
rebuttable pres~mption.'~~On
interlocutory appeal, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the
ruling, striking the Kansas compensation scheme on quite different grounds,
as unconstitutionally impacting on Kansas attorneys' equal protection rights,
and held only that "[tlhe indigent defendant has a right to competent counsel
. . . [but] has no right to adequately paid counsel. . .
2. Fee-Capping & Judicial Discretion
State statutes setting inflexible maximum assigned counsel fees have been
successfully challenged as unconstitutionally limiting the power of the
judiciary to administer justice. Such challenges seemed unlikely in 1963
when at least one court was unwilling to award an additional fee to a lawyer

129. Id.
130. Id. at 821. A number of fairly recent state court decisions have addressed the questions of
whether financial stress caused by low assigned counsel fees creates a conflict between the attorney and the
client sufficient to require reversal of a conviction. See discussion infra Part III.A.3.
131. Stephan, 747 P.2d at 821-22.
132. The court heldthat reasonable compensation who sixty-eightdollars-the amount then necessary
to cover office expenses in Kansas at the time. Id. at 822.
133. Id.
If reasonable compensation is not available for an attorney and does not become so available within
30 [sic] days after a defendant is determined to be indigent and effective assistance of counsel is
not available to such indigent defendant at the end of such period, the charges against such
defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice.
The trial court further created a list of attorneys qualified to serve on the assigned counsel plan. Id.
134. Id. at 833. When Cole was appointed to this case, Kansas had three ways of providing counsel
to the indigent. Id. at 845. Some counties had public defender programs; some had voluntary assigned
counsel plans; and still others had mandatory assigned counsel plans. Id. Not surprisingly, the attorneys
who were conscripted into service were unhappy. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the plan was
unconstitutional because it affected different groups of attorneys differently, violating the attorneys' equal
protection rights. Id. at 846. Furthermore, it set aside those portions of the lower court orders which
defined reasonable compensation in dollar amounts as well as those which mandated dismissal of charges
unless compensation were provided. Id. at 850.
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who tried a murder case for the second time.135But within fifteen years, as the
number of lawyers specializing in criminal practice grew along with the
number of criminal cases, attitudes had radically changed. Judges were
willing to disapprove those state statutes that directly circumscribed their
discretion by capping fees at a set maxima or by failing to provide an override
mechanism for the exceptionally lengthy or difficult case.136
In these decisions, courts recognized, at least implicitly, that low fees and
arbitrary maximum expenditures adversely affect the representation afforded
to indigents. In Florida, for example, attorney Robert Makemson was
appointed to represent one of four co-defendants charged with the kidnaping
and murder of a member of a "prominent local family."137Prosecutors threw
enormous resources into the trial. "Three prosecutors and two special
investigators sat at the counsel table, and over one hundred witnesses and fifty
depositions were involved in the trial."138Mr. Makemson was on his own. In
addition, to avoid the extensive and prejudicial pre-trial publicity, he
successfully moved for a change of venue and thus was forced to try the case
inconveniently far from home and 0 f f i ~ e . I ~At~ the close of the case,
Mr. Makemson requested a fee of $9,500.140 He was paid the statutory
maximum-$2,000. 14'

135. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 187 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1963). counsel was assigned to defend an
indigent defendant charged with murder. Johnson, 187 A.2d at 761. After the conviction, the trial judge
awarded the attorney the $500 per case maximum fee allowable under the state statute. Id. The conviction,
however, did not dampen counsel's enthusiasm. He kept on litigating, filing post-conviction motions, and
arguing the appeal. Id. at 761. Ultimately, on retrial, the judge found the defendant guilty of second-degree
murder. Id. at 762. Understandably, counsel asked for another $500 fee after the second trial, but the trial
judge refused the request. Id.
136. Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834,838 (N.H. 1978) (noting that
[Wlhat constitutes reasonable compensation for performedservices is, and has historically been,
a matter for judicial determination. Moreover, it is peculiarly within the judicial province to
ascertain reasonable compensation when the person who performs the services is acting under court
appointment as an officer of the court. We view it implicit in the constitutional scheme that the
courts of this State have the exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of compensation
for court-appointedcounsel. The statute, in question intrude upon this judicial function in violation
of the constitutional separation of powers mandate.
(internal citations omitted)
137. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 1111 (Fla. 1986).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. Experts actually testified that the value of his work was closer to $25,000. Id.
141. The trial court was not able to coerce an attorney to handle the appeal even for $2,000. The trial
court had to put the appeal assignment out to bid and ultimately accepted the low bid of $4,500, despite
Florida statutes's limit of $2,000. Id.
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Makemson challenged the fee limits and the trial court held:
[Tlhis court is confronted with conflicting laws, one of which requires competent counsel
for a defendant who has been sentenced to death and the other stating that defense
counsel can be paid only $2,000 for his services . . . . One of these laws must yield to the
other. There is no doubt in the court's mind that the Legislature, if confronted with the
problem, would admit that the law requiring competent counsel was paramount and
superior to the law allowing a mere $2,000 fee for the dreadful responsibility involved
in trylng to save a man from electrocution. Therefore this court finds that [the statute]
in setting rigid maximum fees without regard to the circumstances in each case is
arbitrary and capricious and violates the due process clause of the United States and
Florida Constitutions. In simpler language, the Statute is impractical and won't work.142

The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding the statute unconstitutionally
limited the power of the judiciary to administer justice and protect the rights
of the accused:'43"[wle must focus upon the criminal defendant whose rights
are often forgotten in the heat of this bitter dispute. In order to safeguard that
individual's rights, it is our duty to firmly and unhesitatingly resolve any
conflicts between the treasury and fundamental constitutional rights in favor
of the latter."144
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma took an even broader a p p r 0 a ~ h . IIn
~~
1989, two attorneys appointed to represent Delbert Lynch on a capital murder
charge succeeded in convincing the jury to sentence Mr. Lynch to life.
Counsel requested fees well in excess of the statutory maximum of $3,200.146
The trial court approved the request, holding the fee cap uncon~titutional.~~~
On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed and went even further.
Relying on the judiciary's "direct and inherent constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law,"'48the Court made a finding which substantially
changed the assigned counsel system in 0klah0rna.l~~
In that state, attorneys in counties without public defender offices could
be involuntarily conscripted into service.'50In counties with public defenders,
the need for assigned counsel was much less acute and attorneys were not

142. Id. (quoting Martin County v. Makemson, 464 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985)
(Anstead, C.J., dissenting)).
143. Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1 1 12.
144. Id. at 1113.
145. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
146. Id. at 1153-54.
147. Id. at 1154.
148. Id. at 1162.
149. Id. at 1159-60.
150. Id. at 1159.
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forced to accept assignment^.'^^ The Oklahoma Court declared the disparity
encouraged the
in the treatment of assigned counsel to be unconstitutional,~52
creation of voluntary pools of attorneys to end the practice of involuntary
assignment,Is3ordered the establishment of a statewide pay scale, held that
"[iln order to place the counsel for the defense on an equal footing with
counsel for the prosecution, provision must be made for compensation of
defense counsel's reasonable overhead and out of pocket expense^,"'^^ and,
finally, reaffirmed the trial court's power to award extraordinary fees when
appropriate.lSs Reacting to the ruling, the Oklahoma legislature created an
Indigent Defense Board that organized a state-wide plan for the provision of
indigent defense services and raised assigned counsel rates.ls6
Thus, litigation begun narrowly as a challenge to a restrictive payment
scheme generated far-reaching change. In condemning statutes that limited
judicial discretion, courts in Oklahoma, Florida and New HampshirelS7
asserted their power to ensure criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights
in the face of legislative inactivity.

3. Fee Caps as Creating a Conflict of Interest
Defense attorneys have argued that low fees and maximum awards
engender a unresolvable conflict between counsel and client that necessarily
adversely affects the quality of representation and requires reversal of a
conviction. This argument builds upon precedent requiring reversal of a
conviction where counsel was either completely denied at a critical stage in
the criminal proceeding or was not removed from the case despite a clear
conflict of interest.Is8 In those situations, prejudice is presumed.

151. Id.
152. Id. at 1163.
153. Id. at 1159-60.
154. Id. at 1161.
155. See id. at 1161-62. See also Bye v. Dist. Court County of Larimore, 701 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo.
1985) (holding that the 'judicial branch of government possesses the inherent power to determine and
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated
responsibilities').
156. OKLA.STAT.ANN. tit. 22, 8 1355-1370 (West Supp. 2001).
157. Smith v. State, supra note 136.
158. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding that a young and inexperienced
attorney who was given only three weeks to prepare for a technically complex and lengthy mail fraud trial
was not per se ineffective). The Court held that there are circumstances "so likely to prejudice the accused
that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id. at 658. See, e.g., Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (arguingthat representationwas ineffective where one attorney was appointed
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This strategy has not been successful.159Although courts understand the
tension between economic self-interest and zealous advocacy, they are not
persuaded that such routine and pervasive conflict undermines the reliability
of a verdict or even affects attorney performance. Without explicitly
distinguishing between an economic conflict and other more obviously
prejudicial conflicts (such as when one attorney represents multiple clients
with intersecting and incompatible defenses), no court has held that an
economic conflict compels reversal unless, just as in the typical postconviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim, there has been actual injury
to the defendant.'60
When counsel agreed to represent Christopher Bacon, an escapee from
a local Vermont correctional facility, on a murder charge at the assigned rate
of twenty-five dollars an hour, the attorney was unaware of the case's full
complexity.I6' During discovery, counsel realized that the prosecution
intended to call an expert to testify to a DNA match between the murder
victim's blood and blood stains found on the defendant's vest and jeans.162
Counsel asked for permission to withdraw from the case and moved for
dismissal of the charges.163He claimed that the low fees coupled with the
amount of preparation time required created an unresolvable conflict between
his client and himself.'64The request was denied.165Meanwhile, counsel was

to represent an entire group of innocent, falsely accused young men); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475
(1978) (reversing a conviction because the (rial court failed to inquire into the conflict).
159. See State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54 (Vt. 1995).
160. Id.; Webb v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 528 S.E.2d 138 (Va. Ct. App. 2000).
161. Bacon, 658 A.2d at 66.
162. Id. at 67.
163. Id. at 66.
164. See id.
165. Id. at 67. As my colleague Professor Vanessa Merton has noted
The reported opinions on ineffective assistance are replete with examples of lawyers pleading with
trialjudges, fruitlessly,to be relieved from criminal defense appointmentsbecause the lawyers knew
that they were or would be in stark violation of DR 6-101(A)(1). . . . See, e.g., Aldrich v.
Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630,633 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (holding that continuance will not be granted even
though counsel stated that he was 'totally unprepared' and not in a position to provide competent
legal representation;as a result, defendant convicted and sentenced to death); Dillon v. Duckworth,
751 F.2d 895,897 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding conviction and death sentence of defendant despite
trial court's denial of defense lawyer's request for continuance of murder trial because of his
inability to prepare due to three major life crises-his father's heart surgery, his brother's paralysis,
and his own divorce-in the preceding three months; counsel had been ordered to proceed even
though he had spent less than four hours with defendant); United States v. Ruiz, 533 F.2d 939,
939-40 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to grant continuance or withdrawal even though counsel had been
arrested on an extradition warrant during trial, and had requested continuance after release because
he was in 'emotional shamble' and could not proceed); United States v. Ploeger, 428 F.2d 1204,
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unable to find a DNA expert willing to consult on the case for the fee that the
assigned counsel administrator was willing to pay.'66 In the end, he failed to
contest the admissibility of the DNA evidence, or to cross-examine the state's
DNA experts, or to call any expert witnesses of his own. Instead, he sat
quietly while the evidence was i n t r ~ d u c e d . ' ~ ~
One of the grounds for Bacon's appeal was ineffective assistance of
counsel. He contended that the "State's failure to pay [his counsel] in a timely
manner for expenses and services . . . created a conflict of interest by forcing
counsel to choose between his family's financial welfare and his loyalty to his
client, thereby denying defendant effective assistance of counsel."'68
Although the Vermont Supreme Court implicitly accepted the premise
that low attorney fees could create a valid conflict, it nonetheless refused to
reverse Bacon's c o n ~ i c t i o n . ' ~ ~
There was no evidence that trial counsel neglected this case or that he was forced, out of
financial necessity, to spend less time on this case than he should have spent. He made
no attempt to show specifically how the State's failure to pay him in a timely manner
limited his preparation of his client's defense.

In short, the Court found that trial counsel and his witnesses had simply
attacked, in a general way, the state system for compensating assigned

1205 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding conviction and twenty-year sentence of defendant after one-day
trial, although lawyer had been ordered to trial on his first day of appearance in the case, and had
told the judge that he had never seen the indictment, investigated, nor prepared the case); Wood v.
Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225 (1984). overruled in part on other grounds, DeLisio v. Alaska
Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); see also Stem v. County Court, 773 P.2d 1074,1080
(Colo. 1989)(holding that an attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant who believesthat
he or she is incompetent to handle the case bears the burden of proving that incompetence to the
court); State v. Wilson, 687 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (denying defense counsel's
request to withdraw form the case, despite his contention that he could not adequately defend his
client because he was intimidated by the trial judge); In re J. R. C., 593 S.W.2d 124, 124-25 (Tex.
App. 1979) (finding that lower court properly denied counsel's request to withdraw due to his lack
of experience and familiarity with criminal trials); cf. Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (granting on reconsideration an initial denial of motion to withdraw in felony
case, but holding lawyer in contempt and fining him $500 for informing defendant that he felt
incompetent to provide representation). See generally Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of
Counsel: Right of Attorney to Withdraw, as Appointed Defense Counsel, Due to Self-Avowed
Incompetence, 16 A.L.R.5th 118 (1993 & Supp. 2000).
Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment" if
You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAML. REV.997, 1027-28 n.83 (2000).
166. State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54.67 (Vt. 1995).
167. Id.
168. Id. at 66.
169. Id. at.67-69.

Heinonline - - 63 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 320 2001-2002

20021

TAKE COURAGE

32 1

counsel, rather than establishing that the purported conflict had a concrete
effect on this particular defendant This was insufficient to meet defendant's
burden. 170
The economic conflict cases raise a valid issue. It is virtually impossible
for an underpaid assigned counsel or contract lawyer to work as diligently for
an assigned client as that lawyer might fike or as the facts might warrant. The
poorly paid lawyer will inevitably tend to complete work on assigned criminal
cases as quickly as possible. The more time an assigned case takes, the less
time the lawyer has for a better paying client, or even for additional assigned
matters.
The conflict is real. Even the most diligent lawyers struggle with it every
day as they try to make a living and zealously advocate for their clients.
However, if the issue is raised by an individual attorney during the pendency
of a particular assignment, it will be resolved pre-trial either by the trial court
substituting one lawyer for another-with uncertain benefit for the client, or
by an award of extraordinary fees for the individual attorney-with no
beneficial effect for other, similarly situated, attorneys or their clients. If the
economic conflict is raised post-conviction as a challenge to the reliability of
a particular conviction, it will be measured by the post-conviction Strickland
ineffectiveness standard,17' requiring a showing of specific prejudice, and is
thus unlikely to succeed.

B. Systemic Litigation-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
Overall, fee litigation has been only moderately successful in improving
the delivery of defense services to the poor. The approach has inherent
limitations. First, the cases focus primarily on the interests of lawyers to be
compensated fairly-rather than on the rights of indigent defendants to

170. Id. at 68. See also State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997). There, Von Lester Taylor raised
a similar economic argument to the Utah assigned counsel system in 1997, after his attorney gave a closing
argument which contained no logical arguments and failed to ask the jury for mercy. Id. at 688. Although
the Court found that "[o]verall, Levine did not give a virtuoso performance," id., that poor compensation
attracts poor attorneys, and that poorly paid attorneys fail to spend the time needed to prepare a case, id.
at n.2, the Court could find no support in the record for the purported conflict. Id. at 690. Levine had not
requested additional funds at any time, nor had he asked for assistance, or to be relieved from the case. See
id. at 688. Moreover, appellate counsel did not explain the casual relationship between low assigned
counsel fees and Mr. Levine's poor performance. See id. Accord Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d
138, 142-45 (Va. App. 2000) (holding that Virginia's rate of pay, then lower than any other state's, did not
cause a conflict of interest for assigned counsel).
171. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). See discussion supra notes 50 and 110
and accompanying text.
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effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, fee litigation is simply too
restrictive an approach to generate far-reaching change. Even if a challenge
is successful in raising fees, a decision in a fee litigation case generally does
nbt address the other problems that frequently exist in an assigned counsel
plan: lack of supervision; lack of independence of counsel; and the absence
of appointment standards, training, or support services. Although individual
courts have leveraged requests for additional fees into opportunitiesto revamp
entire indigent defense delivery systems,'72typically courts resolve the cases
and controversies before them with narrow and specific rulings. Lf a lawyer
requests additional fees or a higher rate of pay, courts will limit the relief
granted to that request. Thus fee litigation addresses only a single facet of the
complex arrangement for providing criminal defense services.
The more effective strategy is to mount a systemic Sixth Amendment
challenge to a jurisdiction's mechanism for providing criminal defense
services.'73 A systemic challenge can address a broad range of issues; it can
focus on the rights of defendants, not their lawyers and can analyze the quality
of representation provided to the entire class of individuals who receive
criminal defense services, rather than just the services provided in one
particular trial. Further, the approach can trigger broad remedies-injunctive
or declaratory relief with the potential to prompt legislative r e ~ p 0 n s e . l ~ ~
Systemic litigation is difficult, however. Success is not assured. Careful
planning and preparation are essential. The following ingredients are
necessary: egregious conditions (in other words-a real crisis), allegations of
actual injury to clients, litigation support from a law reform organization or
bar association, and public favor.

172. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990) (changing the operation of the judgment
defense system in Oklahoma based on the judiciary's constitutional right to regulate the law).
173. A number of commentators have made this same point. See Richard J. Wilson, Litigative
Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV.
203,216-17 (1986); Margaret H. k m o s , Note, Civil Challenges to the Use ofLow-Bid
L. &Soc. CHANGE
Contractsforlndigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.1808 (2000); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The
Needfor Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV.L. REV.2062 (2000). See generally Robert A.
Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALEL.J.
231 (1989) (arguing that courts should be able to create "legislation" in the school desegregation context).
174. This is exactly what happened in Arizona and Louisiana. See Stookey & Hammond, infra'note
184 (discussing State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985));Calogero, infra note 196 (discussing
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d. 780 (La. 1993)). See also Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No.
GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C. P. filed 1997); Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456298. 1996 WL 636475
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (where a settlement added fifty-four new permanent positions to the
Connecticut public defender office over a two-year period along with a five million dollar budget increase
over the same period). See infra Part III.B.
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I . Egregious Conditions
When a county provides criminal defense services to clients by
contracting out the work to the lowest bidder without regard for qualifications
or track record, conditions are ripe for litigation. In Mohave, Arizona, law
f m s submitted sealed bids for the indigent criminal work. 175 The presiding
judge opened the bids and summarized the information in a cover letter to the
County Board of supervisor^.'^^ The judge made no effort to distinguish
among bidding law firms on the basis of experience, ability, or reliability
although it would have been possible to do so.177Each year the Board simply
accepted the bids of the lowest bidders-xcept
for one year when it rejected
the bid of an attorney who had been held in contempt for failing to file a
brief.178
The chosen fm would be paid what was bid no matter how many or what
type of cases arose in the contract year; no matter how much time or expertise
those cases required; and regardless of the staff attorneys' experience 1 e ~ e l . l ~ ~
There was no limit to the number of cases any one attorney might be
assigned.laOContracting attorneys were required to pay for the services of
investigators or experts needed in the preparation of the case. Moreover, they
were permitted to have a private practice in addition to their contract work. 18'
Represented at trial by a Mohave contract attorney, Joe Smith alleged on
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by the
contract defense system. Although the court refused to reverse Smith's
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that his individual
representationhad been adequate,182
the court's ruling-in effect a declaratory

175. State v. Smith, 681 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Ariz. 1984).
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
' 182. Id.at 1378,138 1. Nevertheless, the court did reverse Smith's cbnviction because Smith hadn't
been permitted to call an alibi witness. He was convicted again after remand. State v. Smith, 705 P.2d
1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985).
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judgment creating a inference of inadequate repre~entation'~~-nded the use
of low bid contracts in M 0 h a ~ e . l ~ ~
Rick Tessier, a public defender in New Orleans, labored under conditions
In 1991
similar to those experienced by the Arizona contract
Tessier was assigned to represent Leonard Peart on rape, robbery and murder
charges, while he was simultaneously responsible for about seventy other
felony matters in a New Orleans Parish court.
On every available date,
Tessier was scheduled to begin the trial of a different client. Completely
overwhelmed, Tessier asked for help. He petitioned for support services,
explaining that he was handling far too many cases and unable to provide
adequate assistance to any of his clients. The trial court responded positively,
finding that Tessier's working conditions were so extreme as to prevent him
from providing reasonably effective assistance of c0unse1.l~~
The court found the entire public defense system in the city of New
Orleans to be unconstitutional "because it does not provide adequate funding
for indigent defense and because it places the burden of funding indigent
defense on the city of New or lean^."'^^ The judge's ruling required
reductions in Tessier's caseload and suggested that the legislature set aside
funding to acquire a library for the defender organization, hire an investigator,
and ensure support services.189Further, to reduce the public defender docket,
the judge promised to assign future indigent criminal cases to members of the
local bar who were not on any assigned counsel list or plan and who may not
have been accustomed to providing indigent criminal defense services.'90
Ultimately, on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with two of
the trial court's most important findings, while rejecting many of its more
specific directions.191 The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred that

183. Smith, 681 P.2d at 1383 (holding prospectively that representationby a contract attorney would
raise an inference of inadequate representation of counsel). In fact the court said that the county system
was the "least desirable and can result in inadequate representation by counsel." Id. at 1383.
184. See John A. Stookey & Larry A. Hammond, Rethinking Arizona's System of Indigent
Representation, Ariz. Att'y, Oct. 1996, at 28.30 (reporting that the maximum allowable caseloads set by
the Supreme Court of Arizona in Smith were subsequently adhered to by all contract attorneys, and that a
subsequent case in Yoma County, Zarabia v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1996). sparked the creation of
a public defender system in the county).
185. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993).
186. Id. at 784.
187. Id. at 784-85.
188. Id. at 784.
189. Id. at 784-85.
190. Id. at 785.
191. Id. at 786-92. The Supreme Court limited its ruling to Section E, a single city district, and, more
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ineffective assistance of counsel could be determined ~ r e - t r i a l ' and
~~
acknowledged that excessive caseloads could result in constitutionally
"Many indigent defendants in Section E
inadequate assistance of c0unse1.l~~
are provided with counsel who can perform only pro forma, especially at early
stages of the proceedings. They are often subsequently provided with counsel
who are so overburdened as to be effectively ~nqualified."'~~
The Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling-that any defendant tried in
Section E would be presumed to have been ineffectively represented so long
as the legislature did not take steps to reduce the workload and improve
conditions for the public defendersI9'-prompted the legislature to increase
the budget for the public defenders by five million dollars in the next
legislative session.'96

2. Allegations of Actual Injury
Conditions do not have to sink to the obviously nightmarish levels of
Mohave County, Arizona, or the Section E Parish in New Orleans, before a
systemic Sixth Amendment challenge can be mounted against a particular
arrangement for providing criminal defense services. However, in the absence
a
of shockingly egregious conditions, a lawsuit must establish-at
minimum-that the services provided are causing actual injury to clients.
Actual injury can be established through a combination of anecdotal and
empirical evidence.I9' But without the facts to convincingly prove harm to the
system's clients-whether juveniles, adults in family court, or criminal
defendants--courts will reject complaints as not justiciable.
The failure to precisely detail how high caseloads hurt clients undermined
Sixth Amendment litigation in Minnesota. There, in 1992, the Chief Public
Defender filed a lawsuit in the local district asking for declaratory relief and
alleging that the Minnesota funding system for public defense violated the

importantly, refused to implement any of the expert recommendations that the trial court had adopted. Id.
at 788-92.
192. Id. at 787.
193. Id. at 790.
194. Id. at 789.
195. Id. at 791.
196. Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 LA. B . J.
454,457-58 (1995) (reporting that as a result of the decision, a statewide task force was established by
executive order. Task force recommendations resulted in the creation of a statewide defender board).
197. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.c (demonstrating actual injury through various kinds of
evidence).
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Sixth Amendment rights of the public defender's ~ 1 i e n t s . At
l ~ ~that time, the
public defense system in Minnesota was supervised by the State Board of
Public Defense. As part of its monitoring function, the Board adopted
caseload standards for the public defenders. Chief Public Defender Kennedy
argued that constant under-funding forced his staff to handle caseloads far in
excess of the standards adopted by the Board, "and that this overburdening . . .
impaired the rights of his indigent clients and threatened to cause systemic
professional rnisc~nduct."'~~
Kennedy set out the claim in accurate but general terms, reporting that
since his staff of defenders could not refuse new clients, they were forced to
enter quick pleas on behalf of some clients in order to be available for others
and were unable to spend sufficient time with any of them."' No individual
clients signed affidavits testifying to the adverse effects of public defender
representation on them."' No lawyers accepted responsibility for errors
On appeal from initial
resulting from' too much work and too little
success, the Court of Appeals held that Kennedy's "claims of constitutional
violations [were] too speculative and hypothetical to support jurisdiction in
this
pointing out that,
[tlhe district court did not find that Kennedy's staff had provided ineffective assistance
to any particular client, nor did it find that Kennedy faced professional liability as a result
of his office's substandard services. Nor do any of Kennedy's clients join him in
attacking the statutory funding scheme at issue here by presenting evidence of inadequate
assistance in particular cases.204

Because the public defender was unable or unwilling to expose specific
errors or omissions, the court found the claim of across-the-board
The fact that the caseloads of the
ineffectiveness illusory and spe~ulative.~'~
public defenders violated accepted standards was not persuasive, standing
alone. The allegation that the general working conditions would eventually
cause injury to clients was insufficient. The court would not act without proof
that the violation actually caused injury to clients.'06

198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.

Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996).
Id. at 4.
Id. at 6 .
Id. at 8.
See id.
Id. at 8.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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a. Litigation Support

The lesson to be learned from the failure of the Minnesota litigation is
that a public defender understandably will resist revealing how its own staff
is causing or has caused injury to clients. The office would have to publicly
admit error-a task that is unpleasant, bad for staff morale, and potentially
damaging to its credibility with the public. The Minnesota litigation might
have been more successful if it had been brought by a different plaintiff. If a
bar association or a civil rights organization, perhaps on behalf of named
plaintiffs, brought the suit it could have detailed frankly the injuries to the
public defender's clients.
In fact, this strategy has been successfully used by the American Civil
Liberties Union ("ACLU) to improve the quality of representation provided
to indigent defendants in several jurisdictions. In Connecticut, for example,
the ACLU and its local affiliate, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union
("CCLU"), on behalf of named plaintiffs (clients of the Connecticut public
defender), challenged the state indigent defense system (naming the public
defender as a defendant); they asserted that public defender caseloads had
increased over the years while the number of defenders had remained static
and that resources for the defenders had failed to keep pace with the increased
number of cases.207As an outside observer, the ACLU was in a better position
to objectively assess the public defenders' practice, exploring exactly how that
practice, compromised by excessive workload, minimized the opportunities
for clients to defend themselves.
The second amended class action complaint in the Connecticut lawsuit
describes the enormous caseloads shouldered by the public defenders-three
times higher than the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission
of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The complaint further details the
lack of social work services, the absence of library support or computers for
research and word processing, the dearth of trials or other fact-finding
proceedings; and, most importantly, the complaint charges that those
inadequacies were causing harm to current clients.208

207. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456298, 1996 WL 636475, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,
1996).
208. Id. The complaintfurtherreferenced the annualpublic defender testimony in the state legislature
requesting additional funds and a well-respected study of the Connecticut government which criticized the
operation and funding of the defender office, and compared it unfavorably to other state defender programs.
The defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction was denied by Superior Court
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The lawsuit was withdrawn after the governor and the public defender
agreed to a settlement and successfully lobbied the legislature for additional
That funding permitted a substantial number of new
funding for the ~ffice.'"~
hires and raised the fees for private attorneys accepting those indigent cases
that the public defender is unable to handle. The terms of the settlement
require the public defender to oversee the conflict counsel, draft practice
standards, and install and operate a case management ~ystem.~"
The ACLU brought a similar challenge to the quality of services provided
by public defenders in Allegheny County, Penn~ylvania.~"In addition,
litigation supported by the ACLU and the Arnold & Porter law firm is pending
in Mis~issippi."~ In New York City, the New York County Lawyers'
Association ("NYCLA") is challenging low assigned counsel fees.'I3 NYCLA
is able to present a more honest picture of the quality of representation than
could individual Assigned Counsel Plan attorneys.
6. Standing

Law reform organizations suing on their own behalf-rather than in the
draw a challenge to the
name of individual clientslplaintiffs-may
organization's standing. NYCLA's current litigation, challenging the low
assigned counsel fees paid to those attorneys who accept family and criminal

Judge Lavine.
209. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 95545629S, 1996 WL 636475, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,
1996).
210. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 950545629s. 1996 WL636475 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,1996);
Joint Motion forApprova1 of Withdrawal of Action (dated July 2, 1999). See generally Recorder's Court
Bar Ass'n v. Wayne County Court. 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993) (involving a consortium of bar
associations challenged judge-made local rules for the assignment of counsel that would have established
set fees for every case regardless of whether the case was disposed of by plea or by trial). The Supreme
Court of Michigan appointed a special master to hold hearings and gather information on defense services.
Id. at 887. Noting that the system had the dubiously "meritorious effect of speeding up the docket," the
master found that a fixed fee system encourages assigned counsel to persuade their clients to plead guilty.
Id. at 887-88. "'[Uf a lawyer is not paid to spend more time with and for the client, [there is an incentive]
to put in as little time as possible for the pay allowed . . . . Essential motions are neglected."' Id. at 888.
The services of expert witnesses were never available to the indigent clients unless their assigned counsel
lawyers supplemented the public funds out of their own pockets. Id. at 887 n.5. On the basis of those
findings, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the fixed-fee system failed to provide "reasonable
compensation," and that "whatever the system or method [devised], the compensation actually paid must
be reasonably related to the representational services that the individual attorneys actually perform." Id.
at 895.
21 1. Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No. GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. filed 1997).
212. Quitman County v. Mississippi (CN. Action No. 99-0126).
213. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22,2001, at 25 [hereinafter NYCLA].
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court assignments in Manhattan and the Bronx, alleges that the state's minimal
assigned counsel fees and monetary cap provisions214caused an exodus of
lawyers from the plan and resulted in those lawyers who continue to accept
assigned counsel matters to handle many more than they can effectively
represent. Because New York City depends upon assigned counsel lawyers
NYCLA
to represent a large percentage of the people arrested each dayY2l5
claims that
the State's failure to take measures to ensure adequate levels of compensation has placed
the system of assigned counsel on the brink of collapse, creating an imminent threat of
widespread due process and right to counsel violations, and allowed the F i s t
Department's assigned counsel program to deteriorate to a point where it subjects
children and indigent adults to a severe and unacceptable risk where meaningful and
effective legal representation is no longer provided.216

New York State challenged NYCLA's standing to assert the claim^.^"
In response, NYCLA pointed to its historic relationship to indigent criminal
defense. NYCLA was one of the original signors and co-sponsors of New
York City's plan for provision of criminal defense services to the indigent,
~ ' ~
of
contemplated by Article 18-b of the New York County ~ a w . Members
NYCLA sit on the Screening Committee which approves attorneys to handle
assigned matters, handles complaints against those lawyers, and re-certifies
them for continued
Before resorting to litigation, NYCLA
struggled for years to improve the quality of criminal defense services
provided to the poor in the First Department of New York City through

214. N.Y. County L. Art. 18-B 5 722-c (set in 1986 at $25 and $40 for in and out-of-court work).
215. The Assigned Counsel Report does not ascribe an exact percentage to the number of cases
handled by 18-B panel lawyers. The ACP Administrator's Report for 1998 reports that 18-B lawyers in the
First Department represented a total of 177,965 defendants on homicide, felony and misdemeanors in the
Bronx and Manhattan that year (on file with the Appellate Division, First Department). The Executive
Summary of the Criminal Court of the City of New York reports that the total number of filings in 1998
in those two boroughs was 213,206 (on file with Chief Administrator of the Criminal Court). It is unclear
which of these number is the most reliable. It is clear, however, that New York City relies heavily on the
18-B panel and that the low fees paid for 18-B work have dissuaded new lawyers from joining the panel
and current panel members from taking new assignments.
216. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 25 (see Complaint filed 2/18/00, on file with the author).
217. Id. at 26. (See State's Motion to Dismiss on file with the author.) New York State moved to
dismiss the claim on the grounds, among others, that the bar association did not have standing to sue, that
the complaint failed to state a justiciable case or controversy against the governor, that the relief sought
interfered with executive and legislativediscretion not subject tojudicial review, and would requirean order.
directing the expenditure of state funds. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 26.
218. NYCLA, supra note 213.
219. See N.Y. RULESOF COURT5 612 Appendix A (McKinney 2001).
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screening, re-certification, and training. Justice Lucindo Suarez, of the New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, denied the motion to dismiss.220
"[Tlhis court cannot ignore [the obvious fact] that if NYCLA is denied
standing, it would exempt from judicial review the failure of the State to
comply with its statutory and constitutional ~bligations."~~'

c. Documenting Actual Injury: Voices of the Under-Represented
Successful litigation depends upon bringing to the court the voices of the
accused who are not being adequately represented. In its Allegheny County
complaint, for example, the ACLU alerted the Court of Common Pleas to the
serious deficiencies in public defense services caused by cuts to the public
defender's budgeL2" AS background, the complaint described the lack of
training for attorneys, the absence of investigators, social workers, clerical
personnel, expert witnesses; the inadequate library facilities; the lack of
written policies regarding ethical obligations to clients; and the total absence
of any case management system.223It explained how many cases the public
defender was required to handle each year and compared that number to the
nationally accepted caseload reco~nmendations.'~~
It contrasted the county
expenditures on funding for the Allegheny public defender office with the
much greater amount spent on the Allegheny prosecutor and compared the
$2.9 million spent on public defense in Allegheny county unfavorably to
expenditures of up to $13 million in other similarly sized counties in other
parts of the co~ntry.''~
As a result of these and other inadequacies, the lawsuit claimed that
public defender attorneys were unable to provide representation at
arraignment; to counsel their clients between court appearances; to find and
use transcripts of pre-trial hearings at trial; to investigate cases; to obtain
expert assistance; or to file m~tions.''~ The complaint specifically
documented how long some of the plaintiffs had been in jail without having
their case investigated; how long others waited to confer with appointed
220. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 25.
221. Id.
222. Plaintiffs Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-12, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary
Bd., No. GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. filed Dec. 1, 1997).
223. Id. at 22.
224. Id. at 20.
225. Id. at 25-26.
226. Id. at 26-30.
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counsel; and how long still others, with documented histories of mental
illness, waited for psychiatric e~aluation.'~' It included examples of cases
where expert assistance should have been requested, but were not; of
defendants shuttled between multiple lawyers none of whom knew what the
others were doing; and of drug-addicted clients, who should have been
considered for treatment or pre-trial diversion but were not.228
NYCLA used a similar technique in its pending lawsuit. NYCLA
combined anecdotal and statistical information which it brought to the court's
attention in the initial complaint as well as in the brief and appendixes
submitted in response to the State's motion to dismiss.229 In addition to
studies and reports documenting the numbers of cases handled by the assigned
counsel lawyers, the rapid disposition rate, and lack of trials or other factfinding procedures, NYCLA also presented affidavits from assigned counsel
attorneys who believed that they were at risk of rendering ineffective
assistance of counsel because of their working condition^.'^^
The New York Supreme Court rejected New York State's argument that
NYCLA's claim was not j~sticiable.~~'
"The fact that this case may have
political overtones, involve public policy, or possibly touch upon executive or
The court was
legislative functions does not negate its justi~iability."~~~
motivated by the stories of the adults and children whose lives were adversely
affected by the challenged representation and by the indisputable evidence of
inadequate representation presented through hard numbers.
3. Public Support

In addition to showing actual injury and egregious conditions, systemic
litigation has a greater chance of success with media and public support. The
NYLCA suit was filed after a flurry of newspaper articles documented the

227. Id. at 2-1 1.
228. Id.
229. See NYCLA, supra note 213, at 26 (the brief and appendices include: the Annual Report of the
Chief Administrator of the Courts (documenting the number of cases being processed in the family and
criminal courts), a Report from the Center for Battered Women's Legal Services, Sanctuary for Families
(discussing the effects of low fees on the ability of battered women to obtain adequate representation);New
York Law Journal Articles (documenting the effects of lack of assigned counsel attorneys on clients),
practice manuals (discussing standards of practice); empirical studies of family court; and reports from the
assigned counsel administrator (materials on file with author).
230. See id.
23 1. Id. at 25-26 (rejecting the state's arguments for dismissal).
232. Id. at 25.
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unfortunate consequences of the legislature's failure to raise assigned counsel
rates,233and the publication of a report on the crisis in the Assigned Counsel
system drafted by the two of the state's most influential administrative
Litigation in Connecticut was heralded by a number of favorable
editorials and feature stories, and bolstered by a respected study of
effectiveness in the state government that criticized the state indigent criminal
defense system.235 In Louisiana, just before Tessier initiated his dramatic
action, a noted expert studied the conditions in the Parrish courts, bringing the
A number of these lawsuits have
inadequacies to the public's attenti0n.2~~
benefitted from pro bono assistance provided by major law firms. NYCLA's
suit is being handled by Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York. Arnold &
Porter is conducting litigation in Mississippi.
4. Choice of Forum
Federal courts have been prevented largely from engaging in the reform
of state indigent defense systems by abstention doctrine. In Younger v.
Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not interfere with
Since then, federal courts have
the operation of local criminal prose~utions.2~~

233. See, e.g., John.Caher, Chief Judge Announced Reforms: Judiciary to Move Ahead on
Reorganizing Courts, Drug Laws 18-BRates,N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9,2001, at 1 (discussing thejudiciary'sreform
proposals,especiallyregarding compensation for counsel assigned torepresent indigent defendants); Daniel
Wise, Assigned Counsel Wins Case and HigherRates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18,2001 at 1, col. 4 (explaining that
several judges had authorized pay for assigned counsel at rates greater than that set by statute in the face
Jan. 17,
of legislative inertia); Robin Topping, Attorneys Protest Low Pay for Indigent Cases, NEWSDAY,
2001, at A3 1, available at 2001 W L 2912240 (interviewing Long Island assigned counsel lawyers who
organized protests against the low rates of pay which they claim affects the quality of their practice).
234. ASSIGNED
COUNSEL
REPORT, supra note 47.
235. See, e.g.,Editorial, Public Defenders are Overloaded, HARTFORD
COURANT,
Jan. 10, 1995, at
A10, 1995 WL 53 18983; Lynne Tuohy, Constitutional Challenge Foreshadowed by OfJicial Reports,
COURANT,
Jan. 6, 1995, at A14 (1995 WL 5315405); and CCLU Suits Lays
Court Rulings, HARTFORD
Jan. 8, 1995, at A1, 1995 WL 5315612;
Bare a Public Defender System in Crisis, HARTFORD~OURANT,
Andrew Blum, Defense oflndigents: Crisis Spurs Lawsuits. Public Defender Say a Funding Squeeze Has
All But Nullified the Right of the Poor to Counsel, NAT'LL.J., May 15, 1995, at Al, col. 2.
236. See Calogero, supra note 196.
237. Younger v. Hanis, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974)
(holding that criminal defendants who sued in federal court to stop illegal bond setting, sentencing, and j u j
fee practices in criminal cases are barred from litigating in federal court by Younger v. Harris abstention
doctrine); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (denying relief for a claim that the Florida
public defender systematically failed to meet minimum constitutional standards in the representation
afforded indigents because the claimants' injury was too speculative, and because federal abstention
doctrine prevents it further refused to intervention in state judicial processes); Noe v. County of Lake, 468
F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978)(refusing to intervene in a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and
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generally refused to entertain constitutional challenges to the operation of any
part of a state criminal justice system because, to do so, would necessarily
affect criminal prosecutions.238So, for example, when indigent defendants in
Galveston, Texas, sued local officials in state court complaining that assigned
counsel were ineffective; that bail was too often excessive; that grand jury
proceedings were faulty; and that pleas were coerced, the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals dismissed the suit because it believed that granting the necessary
equitable relief would require excessive federal interference in the operation
of state criminal
Similarly, the Second Circuit quickly reversed a highly acclaimed
decision of the Eastern District Court of New York which intervened to
improve the quality of criminal defense services.240Amid the success of the
prison reform cases in the early 1970's, a class of indigent defendants
compldined that their Legal Aid Society lawyers were too overburdened to
After lengthy hearings, the District Court
provide adequate representati~n.~~'
agreed and ordered the Society to refrain from accepting additional cases until
caseloads dropped to a manageable
The Second Circuit reversed in
aper curium decision holding that the Legal Aid Society was not acting under
color of state law and that federal district courts have "no power to intervene
in the internal procedures of the state courts."243Thus, although it could be
argued logically that ensuring constitutionallyadequate defense services does
not necessarily require judicial interference with any criminal conviction or
restrain any prosecution,244federal courts have not been persuaded and have,
for the most part, removed themselves from the evaluation and reformation of
state criminal justice systems.245
conflict of interest).
238. Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981).
239. Id.
240. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973).
241. Id. at 835.
242. Id. at 849.
243. Wallace, 481 F.2d at 621.
244. See LRmos, supra note 173 (making that argument in her very helpful student note).
245. Federal courts will consider lengthy delays in perfecting a criminal appeal as a violation of due
process. However, even when inordinate delays have been proved, the federal courts are reluctant to order
systemic improvements as a remedy. Some courts have threatened release of appellants in the face of
excessive delay. See, e.g., Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the failure
of court-appointed counsel to perfect petitioner's appeal may violate due process and equal protection and
that the state is responsible for those violations). At least one court has used allegations of wide-spread
systemic appellate delay as an opportunity to take a look at the operations of the public defender. See
Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that excessive delay in obtaining an appeal
may constitute a due process violation and remanding for a hearing to determine whether the appellate
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The only federal ruling with any precedential value in this area is the
~~
was a civil
initial Eleventh Circuit decision in Luckey v. ~ a r r i s . ' Luckey
rights action brought on behalf of all current and future criminal defendants
and their counsel in Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that "systemic deficiencies"
in the Georgia defense system routinely deprived criminal defendants of their
Sixth Amendment rights.247 The Court of Appeals found that "[tlhe sixth
amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus,
deficiencies that do not meet the 'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless
violate a defendant's rights under the sixth amendment."248 Conceding that
the Strickland standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective
relief,249 the Court explicitly determined that claims of systemic
ineffectiveness may be raised pre-trial so long as plaintiffs can establish
"likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparableinjury and the inadequacy
of remedies at law."250 Although the Luckey complaint was eventually
dismissed on abstention grounds, the Eleventh Circuit decision firmly
established that defense services can be challenged prospectively.
Appellants have alleged that systemic delays in the appointment of counsel deny
them their sixth amendment right to the representation of counsel at critical stages
in the criminal process, hamper the ability of their counsel to defend them, and
effectively deny them their eighth and fourteenth amendment right to bail, that
their attorneys are denied investigative and expert resources necessary to defend
them effectively, that their attorneys are pressured by courts to hurry their case to
trial or to enter a guilty plea, and that they are denied equal protection of the laws.
Without passing on the merits of these allegations, we conclude that they are
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.251

delays are systematic to the Oklahoma Public Defender's office). Most have held that the appropriate
remedy for such violations is a civil rights action for damages. See. e.g., Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d
865,869 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying release because the plaintiff eventually received an appeal); Williams v.
James, 770 F. Supp. 103, 107 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that incarceration was not unlawful where
prisoner's appeal eventually was heard).
246. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (1 1th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District
Court's dismissal. 976 F.2d 673 (I lth Cir. 1992).
247. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013.
248. Id. at 1017.
249. Id.
250. Id. (citing to O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.488, 502 (1974)).
251. Id. at 1018.
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IV. STANDARDS:THEINFORMATION NECESSARY
FOR REFORM
The successful settlements in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, NYCLA's
preliminary victory in New York Supreme Court, and the favorable rulings in
Lynch, Smith, and Peart, demonstrate that state courts will act to improve
criminal defense services-if convinced that the working conditions of the
defense bar are truly adversely affecting client representation. Finding horror
stories or empirical evidence has not been the major obstacle for plaintiffs
confronting systemic litigation. The major impediment has been the absence
of an objective measuring tool to evaluate competence of counsel.
Lacking standards that establish the number of cases a defender can
reasonably be expected to handle, for example, courts cannot assess
complaints of excessive caseloads and will rely on their own subjective sense
of what is appropriate. A judge whose work before taking the bench was in
a city prosecutor's office where assistants routinely handle a hundred cases
each day might have thought Rick Tessier's workload was tolerable, or even
average.252A differentjudge with work experience in a law fm representing
a well-to-do business clientele might have reacted differently. Judges cannot
be expected to make such complex decisions with no more guidance than their
individual sense of what is reasonable or manageable. Objective baselines
establish what the profession believes is necessary and how far the system
under scrutiny departs from accepted practice.
Just as standards for the management of correctional institutions provided
the guidance necessary for judicial prison reform in the 1960's, the
development of standards for the administration of defense services furnish
the information necessary for systemic reform of indigent defense services
today. Fortunately, the defense community has been recently and
energetically engaged in the process of drafting, adopting, and implementing
standards intended to guide not simply the performance of individual
attorneys, but also the operation of defense organizations and systems.253
Three categories of standards are applicable to the defense function:
eligibility standards, performance standards, and standards for the
administration of delivery systems. Eligibility standards are used to evaluate
whether an attorney has the requisite experience or credentials to take on a
certain category of cases. In some death penalty states, for example, attorneys

252. See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990).
253. See INST. FOR LAWAND JUSTICE, supra note 58 (collecting standards from across the country
and publishing them electronically).
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must enroll in specially tailored training classes and certify that they have
tried a number of homicide cases before being approved for a death penalty
case.254
Performance standards are "intended to be used as a guide to professional
conduct."255 The most complete set are the ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense unction,^^^ detailing case
handling guidance for the individual attorney. To be useful for a wide range
of defenders, private and public, the standards are couched in general terms;
for example, one standard states that "[dlefense counsel should act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a ~lient.'"~'"Defense
counsel should not carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size,
interferes with the rendering of quality representation. . . ."258 Another widely
used set of performance standards are the National Legal Aid and Defender
Association ("NLADA) Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense
Representation, which identify the various stages of a criminal case, from the
initial interview through investigation, motion practice, trial preparation, and
sentencing, and suggest how attorney should handle each stage-a model code
of conduct for criminal defense
However useful these performance standards may be for training
purposes, or to inspire defense attorneys, they sometimes set unrealistic goals
for handling routine minor criminal cases and can be too vague to be helpful
in a serious investigation into the adequacy of defense services.260 For
example, ABA standards suggest an attorney should "conduct a prompt
investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading
to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of

254. See, e.g., IND. R. CRIM.P. 24; OHIOSUP.R. 20 (Anderson 2001); KAN. ADMIN.REGS.;
NEBRA~KACOMMISSIONOFPUBLIC
ADVOCACY,
STANDARDS
FORINDIGENTDEFENSE
SERVICESONCAPITAL
AND NON-CAPITAL~ASES,
STANDARD
IU. For a complete list, see INST.FOR LAWAND JUSTICE, supra note
58.
255. ABA STANDARDS
FOR CRIMINAL
JUSTICE: DEFENSE
FUNCTION
STANDARD
4- 1.1 (3d ed. 1993)
[hereinafter DEFENSE
FUNCTION
STANDARD].
256. See id.
257. Id. 4-1.3(a).
258. Id. 4-1.3(e).
259. NATIONALLEGAL
AD AND DEFENDER
ASSOCIATION,
PERFORMANCEGUIDELINES
FORCRIMINAL
DEFENSE
REPRESENTATION
(1995) [hereinafter NLADA].
260. In fact, the drafters of performance standards have generally been careful to state that the
standards are not to be used as criteria by courts in evaluating the performance of particular attorneys or
supra note 255,
in determining the validity of any specific conviction. See DEFENSEFUNCTIONSTANDARD,
at 4-1.1 cmt. (''[qt is beyond the scope of these Standards to attempt to determine the conditions under
which deviation from the recommendations made here warrants reversal or vacation of a conviction.").
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conviction."261 To be sure, on a serious felony matter or even a contested
minor crime, attorneys must investigate, and failure to investigate could be
considered incompetence, malpractice, or ineffectiveness.
Despite these admonitions,it is incontestiblethat investigationsare rarely
conducted into the tens of thousands of minor arrests processed in the criminal
courts of our large
Moreover, in most of those cases-arrests for
possession of marijuana, trespassing, prostitution, driving without a license,
a n t s the charges and wish to resolve the
or ~ h o p l i f t i n g ~ ~ ~ 4 e f e n dadmit
situation as soon as possible, essentially eliminating the need for an
investigation. Regardless of the realities of defense work, the routine lack of
investigation into the vast majority of criminal charges would seem to violate
ABA standards. In this and many other instances, practice is in constant
conflict with performance standards.264
Again, despite NLADA standardswhich provide, at the initial appearance
on the charges, attorneys should "enter[] a plea of not guilty in all but the most
extraordinary circumstanceswhere a sound tactical reason exists for not doing
so,"265thousands of cases are disposed of at the initial appearance.266Because

261. Id. at 4-4.1.
262. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 82, at 760-65. The authors found that Assigned Counsel
Panel attorneys conducted investigations in only 27.2 percent of all homicide cases, in 12.2 percent of all
other felony cases, and in only 7.8 percent of misdemeanor cases. Id. at 762. In addition to their failure
to personally conduct investigations, Assigned Counsel Panel attorneys did not ask the courts to authorize
the use of investigators to assist them. Id. at 763. 10.9 percent of the Assigned Counsel Attorneys never
used an investigator on any case, 67.4 percent used them occasionally, and only 21.7 percent used
investigators regularly. Id. at tbl. 6-3.
263. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York
Style, 97 MICH.L. REV. 291,292-301 (1998) (describing the kinds of arrests-trespass, disorderlyconduct,
drinking a beer in public-which have become routine, the inordinate numbers of such arrests that are being
made in New York City, and the disparate impact on minorities of the police policy of arresting people
accused of misdemeanors).
264. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, The Rampart Scandal; Parks Says Agencies Share Rampart Blame;
Scandal: Prosecutors, Others, Missed 'Red Flags,' Chief Contends. Public Defender Rejects Call for
Self-critique, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 2,2000, at A1 . If defense attorneys are aware of the existence of the rules,
the discontinuity has two possible effects. It can either cause the defense practitioners to feel that they are
continually breaking the rules, or it can cause them to discount the significance of the rules. In either event,
constantly breaking rules breeds apathy to rules and an inability to differentiate the occasions when the rule
should be followed from those occasions when it can be ignored. The Ramparts Scandal in Los Angeles
is a perfect example of the ultimate consequence of this syndrome. Hundreds of innocent individuals,
framed by corrupt police, entered guilty pleas, on the advice of public defenders who did not believe their
clients protestations of innocence and who conducted no investigation into the facts of the charges. Id.
265. NLADA, supra note 60, at Guideline 3.1.
OFTHE CITY OF NEWYORK,EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY(statistics for Jan. 2000,
266. CRIMINAL
COURT
showing that of the total of 367,962 criminal filings in 1999, 197,022 were disposed of in arraignments)
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performance standards, such as those drafted by the ABA and the NLADA,
do not differentiate between the case where a plea should not be entered
immediately and the one where a plea is appropriate, they provide little
guidance either for lawyers who need to prioritize their work or for judges
called upon to evaluate the adequacy of a defense services system that
provides representation to thousands of people. In fact, the standards seem
almost irrelevant to the inquiry.
The third type of standard serves to guide the operation of defender plans
or organizations. These "administration" standards address the functioning
of systems rather than the performance of individual lawyers, focusing on
management issues such as; whether the organization monitors the
performance of its staff through supervision or other kinds of case
management and control (including case and workload limits); whether it
provides training or continuing legal education; and whether it supports staff
by supplying ancillary investigative, social work and expert services, or
adequate facilities. In short, administration standards look at whether the
defense organization furnishes the ingredients essential to the functioning of
a law firm providing criminal defense service^.'^' Administration standards
are easier to draft accurately than standards which purport to identify when
and for which clients lawyering services ought to be employed. Everyone in
the defense community can agree that a defense organization ought to provide
investigators for its lawyers, that it should ensure sufficient word processing
capability so that motions can be typed, or that it shouldlimit the number of
cases its staff accepts--even though it is obviously impossible to identify, in
the abstract, when an investigation should be conducted or when the defendant
should exercise his right to testify, to give just two examples of the difficulty
with performance standards.268While performance standards must be vague
enough to apply,to a multitude of situations, administration standards can be
specific. Thus, administration standards are a better tool for the evaluation of
systems than performance standards are for measuring the effectiveness of an
individual attorney on an individual case.269

(on file with the Chief Administrative Judge).
267. Naturally, there is some overlap between the performance, qualification and administration
standards. Administration standards generally include requirements that relate to attorney qualifications
as well as some provisions (such as when an attorney should begin representation and the duration of that
representation) which could be easily categorized within performance standards.
268. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688-89 ("No particular set for counsel's conduct
can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant.").
269. Further, while the appropriate remedy for an individual attorney's failure to comply with
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Administration standards have been tested as a tool for monitoring the
effectiveness of defense systems. In New York City, the intermediate
appellate court for the First Judicial Department (presiding over appeals from
the Bronx and Manhattan) adopted rules establishing an Indigent Defense
Organization Oversight Committee ("IDOOC") with the responsibility to
evaluate and monitor the provision of defense services by organized providers
in those
TOcarry out its task, IDOOC borrowed from the ABA
accreditation process which measures law schools against a set of standards
generated by the legal education community. First, with input and advice
from the organizations subject to monitoring, IDOOC drafted detailed
administration standard^.'^' Then, each organization was asked to complete
a self-study detailing its compliance with the standards. Finally, with the
assistance of volunteer lawyers from local bar associations,IDOOC conducted
site visits to confirm the information in the self-study.
Analysis revealed most of the providers evaluated between 1996and 1999
were in compliance with the IDOOC Guidelines, although the process did
reveal inadequacies and strengths in the defense providers.272IDOOC reports
its findings annually to the First Department. Although the Court could take

performance standards might be the reversal of the client's conviction, the appropriate remedy for an
organization's failure to comply with administration standards is systemic change.
270. N.Y. RULESOFCOURT5 613 (McKinney's 2001). In reaction to the decision of the Mayor of
the City of New York to contract out portionsof the indigent defense work in New York City to new and
untested law fums, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department enacted Court Rules which
authorized the creation of an oversight committee to monitor and evaluate the provision of services by all
contract providers in the First Department (the Bronx and New York County). Id.
27 1. General Requirementsfor All OrganizationsProviding Defense Services to Indigent Defendants
(1996) (promulgated pursuant to N.Y. RULESOF COURTat § 613.5, and available from the New York
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fist Department), available at http://www.NYSDA.org/DefenseServicesldefense-services.html. Since detailed standards are easier to use in monitoring than vague ones
which could be open to multiple interpretations, IDOOC added specifics to its standards for the
administration of defense services. The training standard, for example, includes sections discussing
continuing legal education, trial advocacy training, as well as new attorney training. Id. The standards
further require: a 1:10 supervisor to attorney ratio, periodic performance evaluations of staff by the
supervisors,advertisementof opportunities for promotion, sufficient support services,and implementation
of case management and quality control systems. Id. The most important IMXX3standard is the limit on
attorney caseloads-since no attorney can provide quality services to too many clients. To provide added
incentive to meet the standards, IDOOC decided that failure to meet any one of the standards would create
a rebuttable presumption that the organization as a whole was not providing quality services. Id. The
burden would be on the organization to explain how it was providing quality representation despite the
failure. Id.
272. IDOOC has generated four reports: for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. The repons
generated media attention and perhaps influenced providers to make changes. Nothing in the Court Rules
gives IWOCany power to enforce its findings. See N.Y. RULESOF COURT(McKinney 2001).
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action to prevent assignment of cases to out-of-compliance organizations,thus
far it has not.
The New York Appellate Division's experience proves standards can be
used by a monitoring body to evaluate the performance of a defender office.
So long as the standards are drafted, or ratified in some way, by the relevant
community subject to review, and if the monitoring body is seen to be nonpolitical, fair, and knowledgeable, the results of the evaluation will be
credible. Just as the development of correctional standards rendered the
abstract notion of cruel and unusual punishment justiciable, so do
administration standards translate the idea of effective assistance of counsel
into a concrete form that can be used by a court.

Three of the four elements which Feeley and Rubin characterize as
prerequisites for judicial policy making are easily identifiable in the adequacy
of counsel context.273Crisis in the criminal justice system-in particular the
recognition that innocent people are being convicted, that the death penalty is
irrationally and unfairly imposed, and that many cases are rudimentarily
handled-provide motivation. Courts can rely on a growing body of case law
construing the Sixth Amendment to support intervention and guide decisionmaking. Moreover, standards designed to guide the administration of defense
services provide a measure against which to consider challenged operations.

273. See FEELEY& RUBIN,supra note 5, at 211-33. In a book review published in July, 1999,
Professor Marc Miller disputes Feeley and Rubin's conclusion that judges frequently engage in policy
M. FEELEY
making. Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN.L. REV.1751 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM
& EDWARD
L.RUBLN,JUDICIAL
POLICY MAKINGAND THE MODERNSTATE(1998)). TO Support his
argument, Miller points to what he characterizes as the failure of courts to plunge into detailed, prolonged,
and exacting reformation of indigent criminal defense systems. Recognizing that the iildigent criminal
defense systems are appropriate for judicial intervention, he suggests that were Feeley and Rubin's premise
true, morecourts would have already followed the lead of Pear?, Smith and Lynch. Id. at 1801-03. Instead,
he asserts that, even subsequent to those decisions, courts presented with opportunities to improve criminal
defense systems have ducked the challenge. Id. Thus, he concludes that state courts are more cautious
policy makers than Feeley and Rubin would like us to believe. Id. at 1803-16. In this last conclusion he
is undoubtably correct. State courts did not blaze into reformation of criminal defense systems once courts
in Louisiana and Oklahoma began to show the way. The decisions did not snowball as rapidly as decisions
reforming prisons in the wake of Talley. However, Miller exaggerates the lack of judicial activity in this
area, and, as a result, his predictions are overly pessimistic. Miller points to Kennedy v. Carlson to
illustratejudicial reluctance,but ignores the success of the Connecticut or Allegheny County litigation, and,
of course, his article was published before the NYCLA suit was filed.
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It is a bit more difficult, however, to detect a "coordinating idea" or theme to
guide the application of standards to the system under scrutiny.
Judge Henley was able to see corporeal punishment as a violation of the
Eighth Amendment because he saw imprisonment differently than other
judges. He conceived incarceration as having a purpose-rehabilitation. Of
course, Judge Henley was not alone in his new vision. Prison officials
themselves were re-conceptualizing their work. "[Tlhe rehabilitative ideal
served as a major method of integration between their own role expectations
and their personal attitudes. In many prison systems [rehabilitation was
becoming] the 'party line,' the rationale that prison officials themselves would
offer as the basis for their actions."274 Guards became correction officers,
professionals who trained for their work, who were evaluated, disciplined, and
promoted.
Like the prison administrators of the past, today the indigent defense bar
is undergoing its own re-as~essment.~'~
When I graduated from law school in
1976, young attorneys gravitated to defense work for two reasons. First, they
saw criminal defense, with its emphasis on rights jurisprudence, as a way to
an
to assist the
continue battling for civil r i g h t ~ ~ ~ ~ - -opportunity

274. FEELEY
&RUBIN,supra note 5, at 260. As evidence for this proposition, Feeley and Rubin cite
the American Correctional Association's 1959 version of the Manual of Correctional Standards. as well as
a 1979 Correctional Association survey, in which "prison administrators in Illinois consistently favored
rehabilitation by overwhelming margins . . . ." Id. at n.*.
275. Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note56, at 11.82 (commentingthat "[nlationwide
defender leaders and managers are now discussing ways to expand the role of defender inside their offices,
in the justice system, and in their communities. For example the Bureau of Justice Assistance is funding
a multi-year Executive Session on Indigent Defense Systems at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government
with the goal of improving the effectivenessof the defense function in state systems. . . .Likewise, the Vera
Institute of Justice operates a National Defender Leadership Project (NDLP) that provides training to assist
defender managers to realize fully their potential leadership roles in the system."). "For the importance of
providing a voice to criminal defendants, see John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered
Representation: What is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide, 6 CLINICALL.
REV. 85.98-101 (1999) (criminal defense lawyer arguing the importance of 'culling much fuller stories
from my clients and actively involving them in lawyering strategy and decision making'). Professor
Mitchell now 'cringes' as he recalls his early lawyering days, when he saw his clients as little more than
an impediment to winning 'his' case." See also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance:
Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J. INST.STUD.LEG.ETHICS199 (1999) (arguing that
Chief Public defenders need to "break out o f . . . their roles forcing them to operate solely within budget
guidelines").
276. See Stuntz, supra note 92, at 5. 'The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure
arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendant much worse
than white ones. Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law."
Id.
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underprivileged and work for a more just so~iety."~
Second, young attorneys
were attracted to defense work because it gave them an opportunity to try
cases-to challenge authority in an acceptable form.278 Both motivations
focus on outcomes-winning was everything.
Since then, criminal procedure has changed. Today rights jurisprudence
is less important to the eventual outcome of a case than is the reasonableness
of police conduct.279As a result, young defenders are less able to win pre-trial
motions based on constitutional violations. Advocates must look at other
approaches to winning cases and helping clients. Possibly defenders will
devote increased attention to building true defenses to criminal
charges--defenses such as alibi, justification, mistake, lack of intent-that
focus on questions of innocence and guilt and degrees of each rather than on
the behavior of the police. Building these defenses requires more out-of-court
time and preparation than simply cross-examining police behavior at a
hearing. At a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence for violation
of constitutional rights, counsel can use the police reports prepared by the
testifying officers that will be turned over as discovery by the prosecutor just
before the hearing starts.280To prepare a defense of alibi, on the other hand,
defense counsel must locate, interview, and prepare the witness--on his or her
own. Defense counsel cannot rely on the police or the prosecutor to assist or
to have any information about the existence of this potential witness. To
refute the prosecutor's charge that the defendant intended to kill his victim,
to chose another example, counsel will have to locate, hire, prepare and pay
an expert. In order to conduct a competent evaluation, the expert must have
information about the accused's life prior to arrest. That information, in turn,
must be tracked down and subpoenaed. In order to accomplish these goals,
defenders need sufficient investigative staff, motivation, and the time to

277. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public
Defenders, 106 HARV.L. REV. 1239, 1275 (1993) (reflecting on his reasons for becoming a public
defender).
I saw myself as a kind of 'hero' of the oppressed, the one who fights against all odds, a sort of Robin
Hood figure who can conquer what others cannot and who does not have to conform to the moral
rules society reserves for others. One element of the 'hero' mentality, of course, is the thrill of
winning.
Id.
278. Id.
279. See generally COLE,supra note 1, at 16-62 (illustrating how the federal courts have cut back
on the protection provided by the fourth amendment to give the police greater latitude to search
individuals-particularly poor, young, minority individuals).
280. N.Y. CRIM.PROC.LAW8 240.43 (McKinney 1993).
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prepare their cases.281If defenders start to litigate more expensive factual
claims rather than, or in addition to, the fairly easy and cheap legal claims
which have been rendered largely ineffectual by the conservative trends in the
law, the amount of case-preparation required for the defense will expand.
If the trends in capital litigation can be seen as a bellwether for the
direction that criminal law is taking generally, current doctrine is hinting that
courts are already ascribing more value to a thorough and complete factual
investigation. In capital cases, where the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel
has been raised on appeal or by collateral motion, convictions are more often
reversed for failure to present mitigation evidence or on account of the
complete absence of an investigation than for failure to raise constitutional
rights. In fact, the failure to investigate and feature evidence which might
have convinced a jury to vote for life was the single most common example
of attorney ineffectivenessin the Columbia University long term study of error
rates in capital cases.282
Moreover, in addition to the reduced the power of rights jurisprudence,
the nature of criminal adjudication has evolved. Most cases are pled. Trials

281. Stuntz, supra note 92, at 40 (compellingly explaining how assigned and appointed defenders
prefer to bring legal claims such as suppression motions or speedy trial dismissal motions). He argues this
is because
[flactual arguments are not merely harder to prepare and pursue than legal claims; they are harder
to evaluate. And quick evaluation is key. In a system in which ninety-plus percent of convictions
are by guilty plea and in which public defenders represent hundreds of felony defendants per year,
defense lawyers' most important job is triage: deciding which (few) cases to contest somewhat,
which (very few) cases to contest seriously, and which ones not to contest at all. . . .In such a world,
factual arguments--claims that the defendant did not do the crime, or acted in self-defense, or
lacked the requisite mens era-tend to require nontrivial investigation simply to establish whether
there is any argument to make. Most possible challenges to the legality of a police search,
meanwhile, appear on the face of the police report . . . .
The relevant choice, therefore, is not whether to file a suppression motion or make a selfdefense argument, but whether to file the motion or find out if the argument even exists, in a
world where it probably doesn't. Given how cheap is the process that decides the suppression
motion, and given the expense of both determining whether the self-defense argument is worth
making and actually taking that argument to trial, the system places substantial pressure on
counsel to opt for the procedural claim rather than the (potential) substantive one.
Id.
282. Liebman, Fagan & West, supra note 3. This finding is startling becausevery few ineffectiveness
claims succeed on appeal. According to David Cole,
[o]f 103 reported cases raising such claims in the California Supreme Court from January 1,1989,
through April 21,1996.94 were denied, 3 were remanded for further factual development,and only
6 were granted. Of 158 reported cases raising such claims in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit during the same period, 142 were denied, 10, remanded, and 6 granted.
COLE,
supra note 1 , at 80. Cole admits that these numbers are probably conservative, since many denials
are unpublished and no reversals are.
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resolve only a small number of cases.283 Because trial skills, or the lack
thereof, affect only a small number of cases, pre-trial work should be
emphasized, because finding out what really happened, who the witnesses are,
and what they could have seen is the only key to a favorable dispo~ition?~~
Furthermore, current criminal justice policy has swept more and different
kinds of people into the criminal justice system.28sMore children are being
arrested and charged as adults. More non-citizens are arrested. More
mentally ill individuals are caught up in the criminaljustice system. Criminal
defense attorneys must represent them all and respond to their very different
needs. To handle those diverse challenges, attorneys must be skilled
interviewers and counselors. They must notice when a client is not
responding to questions. They must recognize when a client has been arrested
only because he is homeless and living on the streets.
Finally, specializedcourts requiring specializedcase-resolution skills are
rapidly gaining favor across the country.286 Drug courts have proliferated
wildly from their inception in Dade County, Florida.287 In these targeted
rehabilitation courts, the accused gives up the right to contest the charges and

283. CRIMINAL
COURTOFTHE CITYOF NEWYORK,EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(Jan. 2,1994) (statistics
of 1993 criminal court filings separated into various categories showing that in 1993 there were only 943
felony mals and 231 misdemeanor trials in the entire city of New York, although in that year there were
YORKREPORTOFTHECHIEF
ADMINISTRATIVE
a total of 276,401 criminal charges brought); STATEOFNEW
FOR 1998 (1999) (on file with the Chief Administrative Judge).
JUDGEOF THE COURTS
284. Important or not, fact investigation has not been integrated into the typical law school
curriculum, despite the fact that fact investigation has been recognized as a crucial lawyering skill by the
ABA Clinical Skills Section which identifies the many ways in which the legal profession serves the public
AND PROFESSIONAL
and describes the skills and values necessary for practice. &GAL EDUCATION
DEVELOPMENT-ANEDUCATIONAL
CONTINUUM
(Robert MacCrate ed., 1993). It categorizes the crucial
lawyering skills and values as: Problem Solving; Legal Analysis and Reasoning; Fact Investigation;
Communication;Counseling;Negotiation; Litigation and AlternativeDispute Resolution; Organizationand
Management of Legal Work and Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Standards. Id. at 129-98. In fact, it
could be argued that a pervasive emphasis on trial advocacy skills has actually trained young lawyers
against conduct fact investigation by handing them a prepared trial package that contains every document
they need. Only in clinical courses where students actually handle cases is fact investigation taught and
rewarded.
285. Order maintenance policing, which has been loudly praised for reducing violent crime in New
York City, relies for its effectivenesson arresting the "disorderly." Harcourt, supra note 263, at 343 ('The
disorderly are, after all, the usual suspects under a regime of order-maintenance policing. The squeegee
man, the panhandler, the homeless person, the turnstile jumper, the unattached adult, the public
drunk-these are apparently the true culprits of serious crime.").
286. See, e.g., Susan K . Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-Solving Courts Provide
Meaningful Alternative to Traditional Remedies, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., June 2000, at 8 (discussing the use of
such specialized courts in New York).
287. See LEE,supra note 57.
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agrees to enter long-term treatment.288Referrals are suggested by a counselor
who evaluates the accused and determines the appropriate medical approach.
Treatment is monitored by the
The role of the defender in these
treatment courts is substantially less adversarial-and
perhaps less
clear-than in most courts where adjudication is premised on a traditional
adversarial contest.290
These intertwining forces have shifted the heart of defense work from
trial advocacy-which concentrates on legal analysis, rhetoric, and the
advocates' presentation skills-to pre-trial preparation, sentencing advocacy,
diversion and mitigation. Today, as a result of these changes in the criminal
justice system, organizations providing public defense services are training
their lawyers in diversionary work, investigation, and client-centered
counseling, as their staff handle fewer serious crimes and more "quality of life
offenses,"291fewer adults and more children. For the first time, legal services
offices are searching for ways to evaluate the different services they are
providing to clients as they re-assess their role. Some are even conducting
client satisfaction surveys.292 Further, exonerations of the innocent and
reversals of improperly imposed death sentences should force even the most
well-respected and highly skilled public defense organizations to re-think their
approach to cases.
Courts may more easily see the rushed and cursory services provided by
an overburdened defender as violating the Sixth Amendment if those courts
understand the increasingly more complex role of the defender. Then the

288. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Couri Movement, 76
WASH.U. L.Q. 1205, 1246-54 (1998).
289. Id.
290. Id.
29 1. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Teny, Rate, and iso order
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM
URB.L.J. 457,476 (2000) (finding that New York City law enforcement,
as a result of reliance on "Order-Maintenance Policing" (OMP), an offshoot of the popular Broken
Windows theory of policing which links disorder to violence, has vastly increased the numbers of
misdemeanor arrests made each year, but that, at the same time, there has been a "sharp decline in [the]
quality and sustainability in court" of those arrests). Misdemeanorarrests have increased from 129,404 in
1993 to 215,158 in 1998. Id. (citing Division of Criminal Justice Services, State of New York, Criminal
Justice Indicators: New York City, 1995-1999, at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/c
areastat/areastat.html).At the same time "the rate at which prosecutors declined to pursue those cases rose"
as well. Id. "In 1998, prosecutors dismissed 18,000 of the 345,000 misdemeanor and felony arrests,
approximately twice the number dismissed in 1993." Id. (citing Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed
Aug. 23, 1999, at Al).
Before Reaching Courr: Flawed Arrests Rise in New York, N.Y. RMES,
292. See Clarke, supra note 275 (The Bronx Defenders, a young small defense organization in one
of the boroughs of New York City, has begun to use client satisfaction Surveys to learn how its lawyers
could be doing a better job in arraignments.).
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adjudicatory process should carry increased significance. Outcomes will not
be the only measure of effectiveness. The evolution of the role of defense
attorney from gladiator to client-centered counselor may be the coordinating
idea that, when combined with motivation, information, and precedent,
inspires the courts to make policy.

Some commentators believe the judiciary will never improve the quality
of criminal defense services, whether by applying Strickland or any other
standard, because money is the essential ingredient for the "elimination of
and the courts do
factors conducive to widespread no-fault ineffectivenes~,"~~~
not control appropriations. Those critics say courts can do little to improve
attorney performance through the application of constitutional principles. I
disagree. As Professor Dripps so powerfully put it, everyone agrees that
Gideon was correctly decided.294There is near unanimity that public defense
systems must be improved.295Finally, all who have seriously considered the
question agree that Strickland has not worked either to prevent miscarriages
of justice or to improve attorney performance. If the legislature refuses to
support the defense function, the criminal justice community and the courts
must devise a solution. I believe they can.

293. Vivian 0.
Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead
End?, 86 COLUM.
L.REV.9. 115 (1986).
294. Dripps, supra note 53, at page 307-08.
295. Ihave only come across a single study concluding that public defense is doing a "good job.
The study was completed by the National Center for State Courts. It is entitled Indigent Defenders Get the
Job Done and Done Well, and was submitted to the State Justice Institute in 1992. The report finds that
public defenders do a comparablejob to that performed by private retained counsel. The authors chose odd
criteria to measure effectiveness-speed for example. The report found that public defenders process cases
more quickly than do private practitioners. The authors believed rapid case processing to be a measure of
success. Most other observers would probably disagree.
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